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The purpose of this thesis is to describe the history of the "Irish 
question" and the role of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) 
in attaining peace in the region. This thesis reviews both the 
Catholic and Protestant positions. 
The Protestant population believes that the current wave of violence 
was caused by Catholic support for the Northern Ireland Civil Rights 
Association and the PIRA. Catholics, on the other hand, believe that 
discrimination against Catholics by Protestants and the government is 
a significant factor in explaining the violence. 
Specifically, this study examines the role that the PIRA has carved 
for itself in the resolution of the Catholic perception of the problem 
of discrimination. The argument is made that terrorism is counter­
productive in the elimination of discrimination in Northern Ireland 
because it promotes Protestant and government stereotypes of Catholic 
distrust and disloyalty. Further, the PIRA will be unable to attain 
its primary goal of a united Ireland governed solely by an Irish 
Parliament because its officials are unable to negotiate with the 
British government. 
The troubles in Ireland have been ongoing for 800 years. An 
historical approach, encompassing the years 1858 to present, was 
taken because it is nearly impossible to understand the current 
situation without first reviewing the historical factors. This method 
allows one to trace the rise and fall of the various paramilitary 
groups and the coinciding violence and social change. 
The PIRA is the main focus of the thesis and is therefore studied 
at length. Its tactical and strategic goals are highlighted as well 
as its targets, internal machinery, organization and supporters. 
Perceived discrimination of Catholics by Protestants in Northern 
Ireland from 1968 is also studied. It encompasses discrimination in 
the areas of housing, employment, income, and education. It is argued 
that these were legitimate concerns at one time, however due to social 
change there is presently very little housing discrimination and no 
education discrimination. 
In conclusion, the Provisional Irish Republican Army is working 
against the goal of equality for Catholics by perpetuating hostility 
in Protestants and the British government, and eliminating the 
possibility for peaceful negotiations. 
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WE SAW A VISION 
In the darkness of despair we saw a vision. We lit the 
light of hope. And it was not extinguished. In the desert 
of discouragement we saw a vision. We planted the tree of 
valour. And it blossomed. 
In the winter of bondage we saw a vision. We melted the 
snow of lethargy. And the river of resurrection flowed from 
it. 
We sent our vision aswim like a swan on the river. The 
vision became a reality. Winter became summer. Bondage 
became freedom. And this we left to you as your 
inheritance. 
0 generations of freedom remember us, the generations of the 
vision. 
Author unknown 
Copied from a plaque at the 
Garden of Rememberance, 
Dublin, Ireland 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this thesis is to describe the history 
of the "Irish Question" and the role of the Provisional 
Irish Republican Army (PIRA) in eliminating discrimination 
in Northern Ireland. The Protestant population believes 
that violence is caused not by discrimination against 
Catholics, but by Catholic support for the Northern Ireland 
Civil Rights Association in the late 1960s, and the 
Provisional IRA presently. Catholics, on the other hand, 
believe that discrimination against Catholics is a 
significant factor in explaining the violence. 
Specifically, this study will examine the role that the 
Provisional IRA had carved for itself in the resolution of 
discrimination against Catholics. The argument will be made 
that terrorism is counter-productive in the elimination of 
discrimination in Ulster (Northern Ireland) because it 
promotes hostility in Protestants and perpetuates their 
stereotyped images of the disloyal and untrustworthy 
Catholic. Further, the PIRA will be unable to attain their 
primary goals of a united Ireland governed solely by an 
Irish Parliament. 
1 
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The intent of the IRA in 1969 was a non-violent protest 
against the occupation of Northern Ireland and the perceived 
discrimination against Catholics in the areas of housing, 
jobs, income, and, to a degree, education. It was a 
campaign of nonsectarian and non-violent political education 
and activism.1 But when these non-violent protests led to 
violent clashes with police and Protestant counter-
demonstrators, a split within the IRA occurred, and the 
Provisional Irish Republican Army emerged. 
Arguments have been made that the strife is directly 
related to religious discrimination against Catholics by 
Protestants and the Protestant-run government. Padraig 
O'Malley, a respected scholar on Irish affairs, states that 
the Ulster government, in response to the threat of external 
attack and internal insurrection, "demanded that all 
Catholics be viewed as subversive."2 Furthermore, any 
political compromise with Catholics was seen as politically 
dangerous to Protestant hegemony. Mark Findlay, in 
"Criminalization and the Detention of Political Prisoners," 
maintains that social discrepancies, "economic deprivation, 
discrimination in the provision of housing and employment as 
well as unbalanced and unrepresentative political 
representation, are at the heart of the [troubles]."3 
Thomas E. Hachey, a history professor at Marquette 
University, proposes that the PIRA was born from this 
discrimination. "From the Provo (PIRA) perspective," he 
3 
states, "the British government turned a deaf ear and a 
blind eye to the outrages and abuses of the Northern Ireland 
Storemont government for the roughly fifty years of its 
existence."4 Protestant Unionist groups terrorized the 
Catholic minority at will and routinely denied them their 
civil rights. The passive resistance of Catholics was 
easily replaced in the early 1970s by terrorist tactics 
because "an increasing number of Catholics saw violence as 
their only means of obtaining victory."5 
Richard Clutterbuck, in Guerrillas and Terrorists, 
maintains however, that families living in Catholic ghettos 
in Northern Ireland "are becoming exasperated with the 
continual involvement of their children in the fighting, and 
it is probable that less than one third support the IRA."6 
In addition, "the violence of the PIRA has succeeded only in 
alienat[ing] their own Catholic supporters in the North."7 
Further, "the only reunification which the IRA has achieved 
has been to bring about unprecedented unity between London 
and Dublin."8 
Until discrimination in Northern Ireland can be 
eliminated there will be little movement toward peace in the 
region. Some scholars believe that even if discrimination 
is eradicated, the PIRA will not move toward peace. 
The Role of Religion 
The misconception held most often about the troubles in 
Northern Ireland is that it is one of religion. Reverend 
4 
Paul Badham, a theologian at St. David's University College 
in Lempeter, England, asserts that Catholics and Protestants 
remain estranged due to their wholly separate lifestyles. 
They attend different schools which promote a separate 
ethos; participate in different sports and cultural activi­
ties; support different political parties; attend different 
churches; and are strongly opposed to intermarriage.3 After 
much consideration, Badham concludes that "the contribution 
of religion to the continuation of the divisions in Northern 
Ireland would appear to be very considerable."4 Further, 
if we then take note of the part played by explicitly 
sectarian leaders to frustrate the cautious attempts 
made by more liberal leaders to lessen the cultural 
apartheid of Northern Ireland, we can see that religion 
is a major factor in the current troubles.5 
Badham is correct when he argues that the contribution 
of religion is important in the region. The lives of all 
individuals revolve in some way around the denomination to 
which they belong. However, Badham overlooks the difference 
between religious affiliation and religious belief and tends 
to encompass the two in the term "religion." All the 
factors he describes can be associated with religious 
affiliation, not religious belief. The churches have 
themselves denied that the conflict is in any way doctrinal. 
Ian McAllister states that in 1973 the four main churches in 
Ulster published a joint letter contending that "the 
. . . . .  
conflict rfc, not primarily religious in character. It is 
based rather on political and social issues with deep 
5 
historical roots."6 McAllister claims that if religinri_.is_ 
to_be considered a significant factor, then "religious 
be1ief _shouId bepositively correlated with the strength of 
po 1 it i.ca 1 views. " 7 
McAllister studies several factors to measure religious 
commitment: ritual, the frequency of church attendance and 
communion; belief in the supernatural, the extent to which 
the individual subscribes to fundamental religious values; 
and devotion, religious importance and self-definition. It 
was discovered that Catholics in Northern Ireland attend 
church more often than Catholics in any other country except 
the Republic of Ireland. The supernatural dimension showed 
that Catholics more readily accept the notions of 
supernatural belief than Protestants. Although 
fundamentalist Protestants can be distinguished from the 
more liberal Presbyterians and Methodists.8 
McAllister next examines religious commitment and 
social structure. Age, education, occupation, and location 
of home are correlated to study the link between social 
structure and religion. In both denominations, attendance 
declines after the age of 60; however, devotion grows 
consistently stronger. Persons with more education will 
conform to the group norms of religious behavior, however 
belief in the supernatural tends to decline, because of its 
liberalizing influence. 
6 
In both denominations, residing in an urban environment 
made it less likely for both religions to participate in 
ritual, but it did not diminish the other aspects of 
religion.9 "Clearly," McAllister states, "religious 
commitment is to some extent determined by social 
structure.1,10 
The final variable in McAllister's study is religious 
commitment and political conflict. The author polled 
individuals from each denomination, asking them what caused 
the conflict. The results suggest.that Catholics related 
the^troubles to government policies while Protestants blamed 
the IRA. 
Table 1.— Catholic and Protestant Interpretations of the 
causes of the Conflict in Northern Ireland. 
Catholic causes of the conflict: 
1. Discrimination over housing 
2. Lack of job opportunities for Catholics because 
Protestants are given preference 
3. Influence of the Orange order 
4. Existence of the Special Powers Act 
5. Activity of the Ulster Volunteer Force 
6. Internment. 
Protestant causes of the conflict: 
1. Activity of the Irish Republican Army 
2. Catholic disloyalty to the United Kingdom 
3. Labour Party's failure to stop the growth of the 
IRA when they had a chance in 1969 
4. Dublin government failed to stop the IRA operating 
from across the border. 
Source: Ian McAllister, "The Devil, Miracles and the 
Afterlife: The Political Sociology of Religion in Northern 
Ireland," The British Journal of Sociology 33 (September 
1982): 340, table 4. 
7 
McAllister concludes that "religious commitment is only 
/weakly related to political attitudes for Protestants, and 
i 
\unrelated for Catholics."12 The strength of religious 
behavior, devotion and belief, does not influence the 
strength of political attitudes. Therefore, the lines which 
divide the Northern Ireland community and perpetuate the 
conflict are related not to religious belief, but religious 
affiliation. Paul Badham1s claim that religion is important 
is deceiving because he does not differentiate between 
belief and affiliation. It is clear that religious 
affiliation is a major contributor to the ongoing strife in 
the region, and religious belief plays a very small role. 
The roots of the conflict are very complex. They are 
political, social, and historical. An historical approach 
to the study of the troubles encompasses these concepts and 
can best relate the ideas of yesterday as they apply today. 
8 
ENDNOTES 
•'•Alex Greer, "Nationalism, Internationalism, and the 
Conflict in Northern Ireland," Journal of Social. Political 
and Economic Studies 13 (Summer 1988): 138. 
2Padraig O'Malley, The Uncivil Wars: Ireland Today. 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1983), 149. 
3Mark Findlay, "Criminalization and the Detention of 
Political Prisoners," Contemporary Crisis 9 (March 1985): 
2 . 
4Thomas E. Hachey, "A Courtship with Terrorism: The 
IRA Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow," chap, in The 
Rationalization of Terrorism, ed. David Rapaport and Yonah 
Alexander (Frederick, MD: University Publications of 
America, 1982), 182. 
5Ibid. 
6Richard Clutterbuck, Guerrillas and Terrorists. 
(Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1980), 72. 
7Ibid. 
8Ibid., 73. 
9Paul Badham, "The Contribution of Religion to the 
Conflict in Northern Ireland," International Journal on 
World Peace 5 (January - March 1988): 48. 
10Ibid. 
11Ibid. 
12Ian McAllister, "The Devil, Miracles and the 
Afterlife: The Political Sociology of Religion in Northern 
Ireland," The British Journal of Sociology 3 3 (September 
1982): 331. 
13Ibid. 
14Ibid., 333-336. 
15Ibid., 336-338. 
9 
Ibid., 339. 
17Ibid., 342. 
CHAPTER 2 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE TROUBLES 
The Irish Republican Army (IRA) had warned the English 
government about pending terrorist attacks to mark the 20th 
anniversary of the British military presence in Northern 
Ireland. On the morning of September 22, 1989, at exactly 
8:26, an explosion ripped through the Royal Marines Barracks 
at the Royal Marines School of Music in Deal, England. Ten 
people died and twenty-two were injured, eight seriously. 
The Times reports that "most of those hurt suffered chest 
injuries, fractures, facial cuts, and burns. Many had been 
pulled from the rubble."1 
In what has been called one of the worst atrocities in 
Britain, the IRA, "using Czechoslovakian-made material ten 
times more powerful than normal commercial explosives," 
detonated a fifty pound bomb at North barracks.2 In a full 
statement IRA guerrillas said, 
Mrs. Thatcher visited occupied Ireland with a message 
of war at a time when we want peace [referring to the 
Prime Minister's visit to Northern Ireland one week 
earlier]. Now we, in turn, have visited the Royal 
Marines in Kent. But we still want peace and we want 
the British Government to leave our country.3 
Danny Morrison, an official of Sinn Fein, the IRA's 
political wing said, "that further deaths could be avoided 
10 
11 
if the Government changed its colonial policy on Ireland and 
agreed to peace talks with the guerrillas."4 In response, 
Margaret Thatcher vowed "that the IRA's terrorism campaign 
to force British troops out of Northern Ireland would never 
succeed."5 
The violence escalates. A never-ending battle of 
guerrilla warfare, terrorism, unlawful executions and long 
prison sentences. How did this battle begin? More 
importantly, why is it still being fought today? This 
chapter reviews the history of the Irish Republican Army, 
beginning with the formation of the Irish Republican 
Brotherhood (IRB) on St. Patrick's Day, March 17, 1858, and 
ending with the bombing of the Royal Marines School of 
music, on September 22, 1989. 
The Protestants of Ulster came to Ireland from 
urbanized Scotland and England under the direction of King 
William III in the late 1600s. Ireland at that time was a 
Gaelic, Catholic, agrarian society which was deeply rooted 
in tradition. The newly settled people in Ireland viewed 
Catholics with contempt, which soon led to discrimination. 
The Catholics, on the other hand, viewed the Protestants as 
invaders of their homeland, loyal first to the British 
government with whom they identified. In the eyes of 
Catholics, the Protestants were Britons, not Irishmen. As 
the conflicts between the two cultures mounted, the struggle 
for control of Ireland began. 
12 
Irish Republican Brotherhood 
In the wake of the Famine of 1845-1847 a radicalized 
generation of young men, most of them Catholics and of 
modest social origins, formed a widespread conspiracy to 
eliminate British rule in Ireland. The Irish Republican 
Brotherhood, or Fenians as they were also known, were led by 
James Stephens. He guided this fledgling group in their 
search for separatism and independence. 
Ireland however, was not alone in its struggle and 
received sympathy from Irish-Americans. John O'Mahoney was 
the IRB's link to the United States. He organized Fenian 
groups from New York to San Francisco. Robert Kee, in The 
Green Flag: The Bold Fenian Men, suggests that the arrival 
of five hundred men from America, with arms and officers, 
plus at least fifty thousand rifles, was accepted as the 
prerequisite of any rising of the Irish people.6 
Though support for the IRB was slowly growing in 
Ireland, one of the measurements of popularity was the 
degree of acceptance by the Catholic Church. The church had 
no sympathy for the rising, thus practicing Catholics were 
leery of the IRB and were slow to commit to the 
organization. 
However, as O'Mahoney increasingly succeeded in 
persuading former American soldiers, remnants of the Civil 
War, to take up arms for Ireland, support from those at home 
grew. Fenian military drilling and marching became much 
13 
more prevalent. Stephens had made the decision to strike 
against the British before the year was out. 
Although the IRB was still a "secret society", they had 
minimal security and were relatively open. The British 
government had little problem infiltrating the lower ranks 
and placing informants within the organization. They soon 
learned of the pending uprising, and on September 12, the 
British government struck. The Fenian newspaper, Irish 
People, was suppressed and the office seized. Telegraphic 
communications with Southern Ireland were cut off and a 
police for two months, James Stephens, the leader of the 
IRB, was arrested. 
In early 1867 another uprising was in motion. Kee 
states that 
the military plan was for guerrilla warfare. In many 
respects it did not differ in general intention from 
the scheme of action finally adopted more than fifty 
years later by the Irish Republican Army of that day.7 
Groups of men were to gather in different parts of Ireland, 
concentrating in Dublin and the south-west. These fighting 
men were to destroy rail and telegraph communications, 
attack police stations and harass government offices and 
military personnel. On March 5, the day of the scheduled 
uprising, unknown to the lower ranks, the leader of the 
uprising, Gordon Massey, was arrested, betrayed by an 
informer. However the IRB in Drogheda, Cork, Dublin, Clare, 
Tipperary, and Limerick was on the move. They successfully 
number of IRB officials were arrested 
14 
carried out few of their missions and fell victim to police. 
Many men were arrested that night, others the next day. The 
only success came from the guerrilla tactics of tearing up 
rails, and cutting telegraph wires. Of those men arrested 
in the March uprising and sentenced to death, all except 
three had their sentences commuted to time with hard labor. 
Tom Garvin, in Nationalist Revolutionaries in Ireland 
1858-1988. believes that although the Fenian uprising in 
1867 was strikingly weak it "did not fail to have an effect. 
It was the first streak of dawn."8 The defeat of 1867 did 
not destroy Fenianism, instead it gradually nudged it on to 
a quasi-legal, if still conspiratorial path. The IRB 
eventually permeated all of Ireland and became an integral 
part of all nationalist movements. The executions of the 
three rebels in Manchester turned the men into martyrs and 
perpetuated the cause of Irish separatism and nationalism. 
The Land League 
Although the Fenian movement declined in popularity 
again after the rising of 1867, a new movement was quickly 
underway. Kee contends that "the aim [was] Home Rule, or 
the establishment of an Irish Parliament to deal with 
internal Irish affairs within the British connection and 
under the Crown."9 The man chosen to represent Ireland was 
29 year old Charles Stewart Parnell. His opposition in the 
House of Commons, the newly elected Prime Minister, was 
William Ewart Gladstone, who came to power in 1868. Kee 
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claims that "until his final retirement in 1893 at the age 
of 86 he was to concern himself with the affairs of Ireland 
to a greater extent than any other English statesman since 
the making of the Union."10 Gladstone believed he could 
address the problems of Ireland through two measures: 
/"first by disestablishing the Irish Protestant Church and,\ 
second, legislating to compensate a tenant financially on , 
; eviction."11 
The act which disestablished the Protestant Church in 
Ireland became law in 1896. Disestablishment of the church 
was the first measure the Union Parliament had passed solely 
because the majority of the Irish people wanted it. 
The land issue however, was the critical issue of the 
day. Although introduced in the House of Commons with the 
Irish interest at heart, Gladstone's Land Bill of 1870 was 
wholly inadeguate. He proposed imposition of a sort of fine 
on any landlord who evicted a tenant for any reason other 
than nonpayment of rent. The landlord would be required to 
pay the tenant for the improvements his occupation had made 
to the property. This however, was not the goal of the 
Irish farmer. The Irish tenant did not want compensation 
for eviction, but freedom from eviction. George 
Dangerfield, in The Damnable Question, asserts that "the 
land act of 1870, while insisting that the Irish Peasant had 
rights, did absolutely nothing to advance them."12 Although 
cooperation with the new Land Bill was widespread, it was 
16 
believed that only an Irish Parliament itself could give 
Ireland the justice it deserved. 
In 1877, the total membership of the IRB was about 
nineteen thousand.13 Unrest and increasing bitterness over 
the ineffective land bill were the sentiments among the 
agrarian society. This unrest quickly turned to hatred, 
when in the years 1877-1897 rainfall was far above average 
and temperatures well below. The combination of three bad 
harvests made it impossible for the Irish farmer to sell his 
crops at a profit. Unable to pay rent because of the slump 
in prices, the farmers were threatened with eviction. 
Violence erupted again in 1879 with the shooting of not 
only landlords, but Irishmen who moved onto property vacated 
by eviction. On October 21, 1879, the National Land League 
of Ireland was founded. It^s President was Charles Stewart 
Parnell. The goal of the Land League was to promote 
the organization of the tenant farmers, to bring about 
a reduction in rents, protect those threatened with 
eviction, and finally obtain such reform in the laws 
relating to the land as will enable every tenant to 
become the owner of his holding by paying a fair rent 
for a limited number of years. 4 
The Land League, largely supported through the 
membership of ex-Fenians, scheduled mass-demonstrations to 
fight for lower rent, physically prevented many evictions, 
and provided food and shelter for those victims of eviction. 
The Land League operated through above-ground official 
action and under-ground violence. The official leadership 
of the movement deplored violent measures, but they often 
17 
were unaware of the extent of its use. Kee claims that the 
officially correct character of the organization, however, 
"with its determination to right the poor man's wrongs, made 
it possible for the Land League to enlist the support of the 
parish priests, without which no movement in Ireland could 
flourish."15 
In August 1881 the Land Act was passed in the House of 
Commons. The Land Act, by giving the southern and western 
renter access to the Ulster custom of fair rent, free trade 
and fixity of tenure, put him into a state of "dual 
ownership" with his landlord, however, it ignored the fact 
that what he wanted was no landlord at all. 
Home Rule 
On October 20, 1881, Parnell and several of his 
officials in the Land League were arrested and placed in 
Kilmainham Gaol (jail). No attempt was made to reestablish 
the Land League; instead Parnell founded the Irish National 
League (INL). Stimulated by the general anti-government 
feeling aroused during the recent land agitation, the INL 
expressed a popular national demand for Home Rule. 
For the next several years the Home Rule Bill 
increasingly consumed the time of the members of the House 
of Commons. On September 2, 1893, the bill passed by the 
slim margin of thirty-four. The members of the House of 
Lords, on the other hand, rejected the bill by 419 votes to 
forty-one.16 
18 
During this time, the IRB began to crumble. It had 
split internally and was losing American support. Much of 
the attention of the country was focused on the Boer War in 
South Africa and with the land agitation calmed down, the 
IRB found itself losing power. 
In 1900, a journalist named Arthur Griffith brought men 
of different Irish organizations together to unify them as 
one national society. This small organization was called 
Cumann na Gaedheal; it was the nucleus of today's Sinn Fein. 
The movement amounted to little at this point, and its main 
purpose was to spread dissatisfaction with the inadequacy of 
Home Rule. Throughout the next ten years, members of 
Parliament from Ireland fought to no avail for Home Rule in 
the House of Commons. However, in 1910, the Liberals, 
backed by Irish Nationals in the House of Commons, came to 
power and with support from southern Ireland the 
representatives seemed able to win Home Rule. There was 
intense opposition by the Ulster Unionist Council however. 
Kee maintains that the proposed bill 
set up an Irish legislature with an Irish executive for 
purely domestic Irish affairs, while reserving for the 
Imperial Parliament all matters affecting the Crown, 
peace and war, the army, navy, international treaties, 
the imposition of most taxation in the first instance, 
and even for a period of six years, control of the 
Royal Irish Constabulary. The total supremacy of the 
Imperial Parliament over such an Irish Parliament was 
clearly stated and repeatedly emphasized.17 
It was quickly pointed out by the Protestants of Ulster 
that the probability of a Catholic majority in the Irish 
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Parliament legislating for the good of the minority peoples 
in Ireland was highly doubtful. Thus, special safeguards 
were implemented to give the Protestants disproportionate 
consideration. These were not enough. The Protestants had 
a conditioned self-perpetuating mistrust of all Catholics, 
and they simply did not want to be placed in a subordinate 
position. The solution was an amendment to the Home Rule 
Bill to exclude six of the nine counties of Ulster. 
This exclusion was introduced as a temporary measure. 
After six years Ulster was supposed to come under the 
control of the Irish Parliament. However, the Irish 
Nationalists would hear nothing of it. They wanted a united 
Ireland, governed by an Irish Parliament. The battle lines 
were forever drawn. 
In January 1913, the Ulster Volunteer Force of one 
hundred thousand men, led by retired British General Sir 
George Richardson, was raised. These men carried rifles 
supplied by supporters in England. By 1914, reserve 
officers from the British Army were recruited to take 
command of some of the regiments of the Ulster Volunteer 
Force. Violence was seemingly inevitable, as the Irish 
National Volunteers also had a membership of one hundred 
thousand. Arms for the Irish National Volunteers were 
supplied from Germany and America. 
Meanwhile, Parliamentary debate over Home Rule and the 
exclusion of the six northern counties had become dead­
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locked. The Irish Nationals insisted that Ulster be under 
Irish Parliamentary rule, however the Ulster Unionists 
Council, and its English supporters adamantly rejected the 
idea. On September 18, 1914, the Home Rule Bill was given 
royal assent as an Act. It was suspended however due to the 
commencement of World War I. Home Rule was conveniently 
"shelved" until after the war when a new Amending Bill could 
be introduced and further debate held. 
Most of southern Ireland rejoiced with the news of the 
triumphant Home Rule Bill. There was however, a group of 
Sinn Fein supporters and IRB members who believed the Bill 
to be inadequate because of the Suspensory Act. These men 
were the "Sinn Fein Volunteers," or as they were officially 
known, the "Irish Volunteers." They believed it unwise to 
commit Irishmen to the war effort without being sure that 
Home Rule would be implemented. As the British war effort 
deteriorated, the threat of conscription loomed large in 
Ireland. This threat combined with dwindling Parliamentary 
support for Home Rule provided the impetus for Sinn Fein 
Volunteer support from a few Catholic parish priests. 
After a failed attempt to purchase arms from Germany, a 
group of approximately one thousand Irish Volunteers and 
members of the Irish Citizens Army marched into Dublin in a 
combined effort later called "the Irish Republican Army."18 
The Easter Rising of April 24, 1916, had begun. The London 
Times reported that 
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at noon on that day grave disturbances broke out in 
Dublin and at nightfall the rebels were in possession 
of four of five parts of the city. The General Post 
Office, in the heart of the Irish capital was seized 
and telegraphic communications cut.15 
Crown reinforcements were called in to help the police 
on Monday afternoon. These men easily out-numbered the 
rebels by one thousand. There was increased sporadic 
violence; snipers, artillery fire, and bombings, directed at 
the royal troops and policemen as they closed in on the 
rebels. Kee declares that 
basically the pattern of the rebellion which unfolded 
over the next five days was that the Irish Republican 
Army remained in most of the positions it had occupied 
on Easter Monday, inflicting what casualties it could -
and these were sometimes substantial - on Irishmen and 
others in the British Army, who, backed by heavy 
artillery fire, inexorably closed in on them and 
eventually forced them to surrender.20 
On Saturday, April 29, the rebels surrendered. Casualties 
among the rebels were low: 64 killed during the uprising. 
Civilian casualties were very high in comparison: 220 
killed, over 600 wounded. Among the crown forces, 134 died, 
381 were wounded. 
The uprising was not popularly supported, nor was it 
effective, but it was the first uprising that had ever been 
conducted by Irishmen in the single-minded pursuit of an 
independent Irish Republic. 
On May 3, the first of fifteen executions took place at 
Kilmainham Gaol in Dublin. Throughout the following weeks, 
as more rebels were shot in the name of just punishment, 
resentment toward the British grew. 
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David Asquith, the Prime Minister of Britain, felt the 
rising tension and began working again on the Home Rule 
Bill. Edward Carson represented the Northern Unionists, and 
John Redmond represented the Southern Nationalists at the 
bargaining table. At stake again were the Ulster counties. 
Redmond and Carson negotiated a settlement that would 
separate Ulster from Southern Ireland, immediately giving 
Home Rule to the South. In exchange, Northern Ireland was 
to consist of the six Ulster counties which would not be 
subject to rule by the Southern Parliament. Without giving 
either delegate time to consult with his supporters, the 
Cabinet decided that the proposed settlement was to be 
permanent. Predictably, negotiations fell through and 
quickly came to a grinding halt. The Irish Nationalists 
felt betrayed by Redmond for giving in on the Ulster 
question. They believed that Home Rule should be enacted as 
the bill which was passed by Parliament and signed by the 
King in 1914. 
In 1916, Asquith was ousted from power by David Lloyd-
George. Lloyd-George had once told Carson there would be 
permanent Ulster exclusion from Irish Home Rule. 
Irish Republican Army 
Military maneuvers and drilling began in the south 
again, and by September 1917, there were over thirty 
Volunteers in Mountjoy Gaol serving sentences from six 
months to two years for military drilling or making so-
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called insurgent speeches. As the movement grew it divided 
once again, however Sinn Fein remained a moderate faction. 
The Volunteers, on the other hand, became an independent 
group raiding for guns and rustling cattle to prevent hunger 
within the ranks, all in the name of the Irish Republic. 
Sinn Fein's growing support was revealed at the polls 
in an election in December, 1918. Sinn Fein won 73 out of 
the 105 Parliament seats.21 The President of Sinn Fein, 
Eamon de Valera, took over the fight for Irish self-
determination with the support of not only the citizens of 
southern Ireland, but the Catholic church as well. As Sinn 
Fein contemplated its next move, the Volunteers began their 
reign of violence. 
It began in January 1919, when two constables were 
killed while transporting a load of dynamite to a quarry. 
Robert Kee, in the third book of his trilogy, maintains that 
"the Volunteers stripped the bodies of their rifles and 
ammunition and made off with these and the [dynamite]."22 
While most Sinn Fein members did not condone the activities 
of the Volunteers, Michael Collins was a prominent leader in 
both organizations. He sanctioned the printing of a journal 
which directed the Volunteers to inflict death on the 
enemies of the State. These enemies were soldiers or 
policemen of the British Government whom every volunteer was 
entitled "morally and legally...to slay...if it is necessary 
to do so in order to overcome their resistance."23 This 
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policy of terrorism was neither the will of the people, nor 
the clergy. 
As the violence escalated, the government took 
defensive action. Military restrictions were imposed in 
many southern cities and counties. In turn, some of the 
moderate wing of Sinn Fein reacted to this oppression by 
joining the Volunteers, or Irish Republican Army as they 
were now being called. The clergy, on the other hand, 
condemned the Volunteers for their violent means of action. 
Members of the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC), many of 
whom were Catholic, were being murdered by the IRA. 
Civilians, soldiers, and government officials were also 
being shot in cold blood, then labeled a spy by tying a tag 
marked "Spy - killed by the IRA" to the corpse.24 Girls who 
spoke with RIC men or soldiers would get the hair shaven 
from their heads or their calves shot off. 
On June 24, 1919, Collins' systematic terror against 
Irish police detectives began. Through the next two years 
IRA sharpshooters, on Collins' command, executed high-
ranking police officials who Collins perceived as 
threatening. By November, the government outlawed Sinn 
Fein; however, they again swept the polls in the 192 0 
election. 
By January 1920, fourteen policemen had been murdered, 
twenty others wounded. Until then they had not fought back, 
but with the shooting of a Constable in Thurles, the police 
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began to take the offense establishing a new pattern in the 
violent situation. 
Throughout Ireland, police smashed windows and riddled 
houses with bullets searching for the perpetrators of the 
police shootings. Chaos soon followed in a tit-for-tat 
scenario of violence. Reprisals came as sporadically as the 
initial murders, primarily in the form of fire. The 
policemen burned the homes of suspected Sinn Fein members 
and often burned the local creameries and destroyed 
businesses and stores. The ranks of the RIC began to thin 
as policemen resigned their posts. They were quickly 
replaced however with English, as well as Irish, recruits. 
By July 1921, the total RIC dead was over 400, with 700 
wounded. The total number of civilian casualties is 
unknown, although in the first six months of 1921, an 
estimated 7 07 civilians were killed, 7 56 wounded. One 
hundred of these civilians were shot as spies by the IRA.25 
The reprisals taken by the RIC only strengthened the 
will of the nationalists. The burned homes, charred 
creameries, and corpses of innocent victims were constant 
reminders of the oppressive British government. 
Sectarian violence was prevalent in Ulster. This 
violence was generally anti-Catholic in nature, although the 
IRA did shoot a number of Protestant "spies." The IRA 
declared however, that "no one was to be attacked just 
because he was a Protestant."26 
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Martial law was declared in January 1921, in several 
counties, and internment was now being practiced throughout 
Ireland. The government was prepared to execute all persons 
captured while fighting. In February, seven IRA men were 
executed in Cork. The next day the IRA gunned down six 
soldiers in the streets of Cork. Something similar to a 
formal state of war had now indeed come about and was 
accepted as such by both sides and by the Irish people. 
As negotiations between de Valera and Lloyd-George 
began in 1921, elections were held for the first time in the 
two Parliaments created by the Government of Ireland Act of 
1920. Sinn Fein won 124 of the 128 districts in the lower 
0 7 twenty-six counties and 12 out of 52 seats in the North. 
The partition of Ireland was becoming a reality. 
A truce was called on July 8, 1921, and was to be 
effective beginning at noon on July 11, terminable at 
seventy-two hours' notice. Negotiations were finally in 
progress. De Valera did not attend the meeting in London, 
preferring instead to control the Irish Parliament in 
Dublin. Michael Collins and Arthur Griffith headed the 
negotiation delegation. 
On December 6, Ireland was formally separated into the 
Irish Free State and Northern Ireland. Under the terms of 
the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921, the lower twenty-six 
counties were no longer under direct British rule. They 
were now a dominion, able to rule by their own Parliament. 
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Not only did they control domestic government, but foreign 
affairs also. Allegiance was not pledged to the Crown, but 
instead to the newly formed Irish Free State. Northern 
Ireland was born of the six Ulster counties of Londonderry, 
Antrim, Down, Armagh, Tyrone, and Monaghan. The Northern 
Ireland Parliament was retained for maintenance of domestic 
matters, but Britain had direct control over all foreign 
affairs, and allegiance was pledged to the Crown. 
None of the five signatories from the Republic had 
liked the compromises of the treaty, but Collins and 
Griffith believed its advantages far outweighed its 
disadvantages. The essence of their position was that "it 
gave the freedom to achieve freedom."28 
Unfortunately, de Valera opposed the treaty. It was 
ratified by the Irish Parliament however, by a majority of 
sixty-four to fifty-seven, and de Valera stepped down as 
President. Arthur Griffith took his place. Again, civil 
strife broke out in Ireland, this time between pro-treaty 
and anti-treaty IRA factions. 
Rioting in the newly formed North also broke out as 
Protestants learned that three of the nine Ulster counties 
had been sacrificed. Bitter fighting between the Catholics, 
backed by both factions of the IRA, and the Protestants, 
supported by the Ulster Special Constabulary, resulted in 
massive losses. In three weeks in February, 138 casualties 
were reported from Belfast, of whom 98 were Catholics. 
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Thirty people were killed in a single night. Thousands of 
Catholic refugees poured into southern Ireland; some even 
left the country.29 
Elections for the Irish Parliament were held in 1922 
and reflected the majority pro-treaty opinion of the South. 
Ninety-four of the 128 members of the new government were in 
favor of the Treaty. Collins now had unmistakable 
democratic support for the Treaty. 
Nevertheless, fighting continued in the Irish Free 
State between the anti-treaty and pro-treaty forces. On 
June 30, under the direction of Collins, the newly formed 
government army arrested over one hundred anti-treaty 
activists. In the ensuing battle, sixty-three people were 
killed, 3 00 wounded, and a section of Dublin burned or 
destroyed by bullets. The remaining anti-treaty forces 
retreated to Cork, but by August, Collins' army, with the 
help of the British government, dismantled them. Only a 
handful of militant IRA members were left. 
Unfortunately, the calm in the Irish Free State was 
shattered with the sudden death of their President, Arthur 
Griffith, and the murder, ten days later, of Michael 
Collins. Ironically, Collins was killed by the same squad 
which he at one time had commanded. The new leaders took 
even harsher steps against the anti-treaty remnants, now 
called the "Republicans." Within six months the new Free 
State Government executed seventy-seven Republicans.30 Due 
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to a lack of support, the IRA was forced to go underground. 
The group fell out of sight and remained largely dormant for 
many years. Although sporadic fighting continued through 
the mid-1900s, the IRA did not fully resurface again until 
the 1960s. 
Provisional Irish Republican Army 
Severely oppressed by the Protestants in Northern 
Ireland, Catholic tolerance of government sanctioned 
discrimination waned. In a society dominated by Protestants 
by two to one, housing, labor, income, and social 
discrimination was rampant. Voting was permitted only by 
land-owners, and very few Catholics owned land. Therefore, 
the North was governed primarily by land-owning Protestants. 
As tension began to mount, Catholics emulated the civil 
rights movement lea by the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr. in 
the southern United States. The inspiration of King led 
several Catholics to develop the Northern Ireland Civil 
Rights Association. Catholics marched from Belfast to 
Londonderry protesting the discrimination under which they 
had been forced to live. Predictably, they were taunted and 
beaten by Protestants, as the police, the Royal Ulster 
Constabulary (RUC), looked on. 
Alex Greer, in "Nationalism, Internationalism, and the 
Conflict in Northern Ireland," maintains that the original 
intent of the IRA in 1969 "was not violent, but a campaign 
of nonsectarian and non-violent political education and 
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activism."31 However, as violence against demonstrating 
civilians and the IRA continued, a split occurred within the 
IRA, and the Provisional Irish Republican Army emerged. As 
fighting and rioting continued, the PIRA turned to more 
violent means of countering the mobs of angry Protestants. 
As the pillaging and burning of Catholic communities 
continued, the British Army was brought in to restore order. 
At first the troops were greeted warmly by the Catholics. 
They were seen as protectors, but soon the Army was viewed 
as another useless organ of the oppressive Protestant 
government, which by this time had outlawed all forms of 
anti-government demonstrations. The PIRA became the 
guardian of the Catholic ghettos in Ulster, particularly in 
Belfast. David Schmitt reports in "Bicommunal Conflict and 
Accommodation in Northern Ireland" that "the internment 
operation of 1971 in which Catholics were indiscriminately 
picked up and sometimes abused" to learn information about 
the PIRA, "radicalized most of the Catholic community."32 
The situation deteriorated even further on January 30, 1972-
-"Bloody Sunday." 
As seven thousand demonstrators, some of whom were PIRA 
members, marched down the streets of Londonderry, they were 
brutally attacked by two hundred heavily-armed paratroopers 
from the British Army. Allegedly, some of the marchers 
threw rocks and bricks at the soldiers, who in turn launched 
tear gas and purple dye at the demonstrators, and finally 
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opened fire. The short, but violent battle ended with 
thirteen civilians killed, seventeen wounded, and seventy 
arrested.33 Anger and hate toward the Army grew as the 
ranks of the PIRA swelled with volunteers. Padraig O'Malley 
contends that "by the mid-1970s the PIRA had fifteen hundred 
members, six hundred of whom were believed to be in 
Belfast."34 Killing and maiming by PIRA bombs or snipers 
was an almost daily routine in Northern Ireland as one bomb 
after another killed civilians as well as soldiers. 
Retaliation to the violence was daily also. 
On March 24, 1972, the Northern Ireland Parliament was 
abruptly closed and Britain took direct control of the 
government giving full power to Westminster. The government 
was dissolved due to the escalating violence and the 
judicial system which processed those arrested for 
terrorism. In Northern Ireland witnesses were considered 
informers. The incentive for keeping one's mouth shut, eyes 
closed, and mind blank was a long life. PIRA jury 
intimidation was wide-spread in the North, leading Britain 
to establish the Diplock Courts in the Northern Ireland 
(Emergency Provisions) Act of 1973. 
The Diplock Courts replaced the standard jury trial 
with that of one judge. The Act also provided for the 
warrantless detention of suspected terrorists for up to 
seventy-two hours and wide powers of search and seizure by 
members of the security forces. Many members of the 
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Catholic community were harassed by police and soldiers, and 
some were arrested. More than thirty thousand homes were 
searched in 1972, sixty thousand in 1973. 
In 1972 support was strong for the PIRA. O'Malley 
maintains however, that by 1975 "the movement had largely 
disintegrated, gangsterism was pervasive," and feuding 
between the Official IRA and the PIRA was increasing.35 In 
1976 the PIRA was well encamped in Northern Ireland. They 
recognized their inefficiency and reorganized their 
structure from an hierarchical one, based on neighborhood 
groups, to a cellular organization. This new structure made 
it very difficult for authorities to infiltrate the 
organization, and informers were virtually eliminated. 
In March, 1976, the British government rescinded the 
"special category" status of prisoners convicted of 
political crimes, mainly members of the PIRA. Prisoners 
responded by refusing to wear prison garb or do prison work. 
When this strategy failed, the hunger strikes began. The 
first strikes were abandoned after only a few weeks of 
starvation. However, five years later, Bobby Sands, the 
commanding officer of the PIRA within the prison, began his 
hunger strike. He was starving himself for more than mere 
political prisoner status, he was starving himself as an 
expression of the fight "between the oppressed Irish people 
and an alien, oppressive, unwanted regime that refuses to 
withdraw from our land."36 He died sixty-six days later. In 
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the next three months, nine other prisoners also died of 
starvation. Despite the casualties, the hunger strike was 
an effective method of creating martyrs and recruiting 
support. 
On October 13, 1984, the PIRA attempted to assassinate 
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, a long-time enemy of the 
IRA. Thatcher escaped without injury, but three people died 
and thirty-four were hurt as a result of the explosion. 
This was the first attempt on a Prime Minister's life in 
sixty years. 
Negotiations to end the crisis in Northern Ireland led 
to the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985. This agreement 
provided the Republic of Ireland with a direct hand in the 
governmental affairs concerning minority Catholics in 
Northern Ireland. Expectedly, the Unionist community was 
strongly opposed to the Agreement. Protestant para­
militaries threatened to kill members of the Secretariat and 
other participants. Although a courageous attempt by 
British and Irish officials, Schmitt argues that the result 
was little more than an "imaginative attempt to create a 
framework for progress in reducing political violence and 
generating a sense of legitimacy."37 
As the PIRA violence continued, support began again to 
dwindle in the South. Presently support comes from a small 
number of Catholics in Northern Ireland. Even so, the PIRA 
is now one of the world's best equipped and most experienced 
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guerrilla armies. According to British security officials, 
"there are probably no more than forty active gunmen in the 
North, supported by about 150 Volunteers.38 However, 
political support for the PIRA is shrinking. Part of the 
reason may be the partial ban on Sinn Fein publicity, 
although the party itself is legal. Another reason is the 
Catholic church's view that denounces the IRA and says that 
voting for Sinn Fein is a mortal sin. In the 1984 local 
election in Northern Ireland, Sinn Fein won only 11.2% of 
the vote. In the 1984 election for the European Parliament, 
Sinn Fein received only 2.8% of the vote for the entire 
island.39 Roman Catholic opposition to the IRA in Northern 
Ireland is embodied in the Social Democratic and Labour 
Party (SDLP) founded in 1970. The New York Times reports 
that the SDLP "represents more than 90% of the nationalist 
population on both sides of the Irish border."40 
Richard Clutterbuck claims that since 1969, "nearly 
2,000 people, only a third of them in the uniforms of the 
British Army or the Royal Ulster Constabulary have died in 
the struggle over the northern six counties of Ireland," and 
over 10,000 people have been injured.41 As the PIRA 
continues to participate in terrorist activities, their 
popular support shrinks. 
Clutterbuck maintains that families living in Catholic 
ghettos in Northern Ireland are "becoming exasperated with 
the continual involvement of their children in the fighting, 
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and it is probable that less than one third now support the 
IRA."42 The overwhelming majority of Catholics support the 
non-violence of the SDLP. The violence of the PIRA has 
served only to "alienate their own Catholic supporters in 
the North."43 
Alienation had also been the effect of prolonged 
terrorism not only in the Republic, but also in the USA, 
where contributions to the "welfare" funds which provide a 
transparent cover for financing and arming the IRA have 
fallen to a trickle. Additionally, the IRA has aroused 
Protestant dislike and distrust of all Catholics to the 
point where reunification without another civil war is 
impossible. Clutterbuck states further that "neither the 
government in Dublin, nor the people of the South have any 
desire at present to shatter the peace of the Republic by 
bringing in vicious warring factions from the North, whether 
Protestant or Catholic."44 He further states that "the only 
reunification which the IRA have achieved has been to bring 
about unprecedented unity between London and Dublin."45 
Conclusion 
The IRB was an organization which garnered support only 
during crisis and only with the help of martyrs. The rising 
of 1867 had little popular support, and was a failure. The 
mobilizing factor for Home Rule was not the movement itself, 
but the martyrdom of the three men executed by the British 
for participating in the 1867 uprising. After the Land Act 
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was passed in 1881, membership again declined because the 
goals of the members, ownership of the land, had been met 
with the implementation of "dual ownership." 
In the early 1900s the organization not only lost Irish 
support, but it split into several factions. The passing of 
the Home Rule Bill in 1914 had little to do with the Irish 
National Volunteers, but was negotiated by political means, 
not violence and terrorism. The uprising of 1916, the fight 
for Home Rule, was neither popularly supported, nor was it 
effective. 
The violence in the early 1920s seems the catalyst for 
the separation of Ireland into two countries. The IRA was 
not only fighting the British and the Protestants, but also 
themselves when the organization split into pro- and anti-
treaty factions. The IRA was not the only violent 
organization however; in retaliation soldiers and police 
used terrorist tactics also. The only difference was that 
the IRA was illegal and the counter-movement was not. 
Regardless of the instigators, the violence of the 1920s 
caused the emergence of Northern Ireland under the Crown. 
Again, little was accomplished through the employment of 
violence. 
The only constructive movement thus far seems to be the 
early civil rights movement of the late 1960s. The movement 
was initially organized by people who were not affiliated 
with the IRA and was to be a non-violent expression of 
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Protestant oppression of Catholics. There is little doubt 
that the Prbtestants started abusing the Catholics during 
the protest marches, and that the Catholics were on the 
defensive. However, when the PIRA was born and firmly 
encamped themselves in the Catholic ghettos, whole Catholic 
communities were reduced to targets for the RUC and the 
British Army. 
It is clear that support for the PIRA declined in the 
late 197 0s and early 1980s until the hunger strikes 
resurrected the movement through martyrdom. But even this 
burst of popular support was short lived as the horrors of 
terrorism hit home in Ireland. Since the last deluge of 
support in the mid-1980s, the PIRA had been steadily losing 
its popular and financial support. 
There is little doubt that the PIRA is a well organized 
group that will continue to terrorize Britain, Northern 
Ireland, and parts of Europe. It seems however, that these 
activities only strengthen the resolve of the British to 
rule Northern Ireland and perpetuate the separation of 
Ireland. The PIRA will therefore fail to rid Northern 
Ireland of English influence through violent means, and 
consequently, fail to attain its goals. 
The IRA and the PIRA of late have done nothing but hurt 
the Irish people, mainly innocent civilians who are caught 
in the cross-fire. It is unlikely that the goal of 
reunification of Ireland will be met through violence. 
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Violence only begets violence; the many bloody reprisals of 
the British and Protestants are proof. 
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CHAPTER 3 
PROVISIONAL IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY 
All civil violence had a purpose, an end, a goal. 
James Rule, a noted scholar in the field of civil violence 
and terrorism, maintains that "the objective and targets of 
militant collective action [will] reflect pursuit of long 
term collective interest of the groups represented in the 
action.111 
This chapter examines the objectives and targets of the 
Provisional Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland. This 
examination includes an analysis of the tactical and 
strategic objectives and collective interests, as well as an 
examination of the infrastructure of the PIRA and the groups 
represented by the PIRA. This chapter concludes with a 
discussion on the accuracy of the representation accorded 
Catholics by the Provisionals (members of the PIRA). 
Tactical Strategies 
The universal aim of terror is intimidation, the 
creation of fear and anxiety. Terrorism is usually not the 
random use of violence. This violence has a purpose and a 
goal. Terrorism is merely a tactical strategy used to 
create a feeling of panic among those who are targeted. It 
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is also used to attract the media, creating a further 
feeling of helplessness. Walter Laqueur, a noted scholar in 
the area of terrorism and terrorist groups, argues that a 
terrorist organization cannot survive without media 
coverage, in fact, "the smaller the terrorist gang the more 
it depends on publicity."2 The tactical strength of the 
PIRA is a long war of attrition. The Provos believe that 
they can reach their ultimate goal of reunification with the 
Republic by waging a bombing and assassination campaign 
against prominent citizens in Northern Ireland and Britain. 
Bombings 
There are several ways of achieving tactical success. 
Terrorist use of bombs is a universal strategy. Since the 
creation of plastic explosives, bombs are virtually 
undetectable. They are convenient, many are compact, and 
can be detonated with the use of remote control. Bombs can 
be effective even if no none is injured or killed. They 
wreak extensive structural damage and make a great deal of 
noise, drawing attention which inevitably results in media 
publicity. Michael Poole, a lecturer at the New University 
of Ulster, states that bombings are the incidents that 
arouse the greatest political and public concern, "they have 
the greatest impact on the community and, not least, they 
are the best documented.1,3 
Bombings in Northern Ireland were very frequent during 
the early 1970s, and parts of Belfast have been reduced to 
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empty, charred structures. Padraig O'Malley explains: 
Belfast, ugly and sore to the eye, the will to go on 
gone, the signs of departure everywhere. In ten years 
it has lost one quarter of its population. Buildings 
are boarded up. There is little construction, and no 
skyline. Business is desultory, pace is lacking, 
energy absent, burned out housing estates a vivid 
reminder of the sectarian tensions that mark the quiet 
expression of the passion in private places.4 
Table 2.—Persons Killed in Explosions from 1972-1978 in 
Northern Ireland 
Year Number Killed in Explosions 
1972 143 
1973 69 
1974 57 
1975 76 
1976 71 
1977 13 
1978 25 
Source: Adrian Guelke,"Loyalist and Republican Perceptions 
of the Northern Ireland Conflict: The Ulster defense Force 
and the Provisional IRA," chap, in Political Violence and 
Terrorism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 
103, table 3. 
The sophistication of PIRA explosives has grown with 
increasing commercial technology. In the early days the IRA 
used unsophisticated devices made from alarm clocks, 
electric circuits and inflammable material. These days the 
bombs are often hidden inside cassette tape boxes or 
gasoline cans and are virtually undetectable. 
Incendiary devices, or firebombs, have long been a 
favorite weapon in the armory of the IRA. They were 
developed in the mid-1970s as a device for reaching targets 
with high consumer or passenger traffic. Incendiary bombs 
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have been found at several London train stations, inside 
underground trains, and in several Manchester stores. Left 
intact, the devices would have exploded into a sudden blaze, 
then created a larger fire, eventually destroying the 
property and possibly injuring or killing many. 
Few are immune from the Provisionals. Then Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher was the target of a bomb placed 
in The Grand Hotel on October 13, 1984. This particular 
explosion created world-wide attention, as it was the first 
attempt on the life of a Prime Minister in sixty years. 
One of the most effective bombings by the Provos occurred in 
London on July 20, 1980. Six British soldiers on horseback 
and two civilians were killed, and fifty others were injured 
when two bombs exploded during ceremonial duties. One 
company of soldiers in full regalia was making the daily 
ride from their barracks to Whitehall, the other members 
were in the band and playing to a lunchtime audience. 
O'Malley states that "the spectacle of the splendid animals 
reduced to a bloodied pulp moved the public as much, if not 
more, than the human dead."5 
The London Times reports however that bombs are "used 
infrequently on the British mainland [and] remain a mainstay 
of the IRA campaign in Ulster."6 Between January and August 
of 1991, the RUC had recorded 39 incidents involving 169 
incendiary devices, and fourteen stores were destroyed in 
Belfast causing 25 million pounds in damage.7 
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A particularly gruesome method of bombing used by the 
Provos in Northern Ireland is a "proxy bomb." The PIRA will 
kidnap a family and force one person to drive a vehicle 
containing the bomb to its destination while holding the 
other family members hostage to ensure completion of the 
mission. If the orders or not carried out, and the bomb is 
not delivered, the Provos will murder the hostages and 
detonate the bomb by remote control killing the driver. 
This method was used on February 4, 1991 to blow up an 
Ulster Defense Regiment (UDR) base in County Londonderry, 
causing considerable damage to the base and surrounding 
homes. 
On April 9, 1991, the Provisionals used a woman hostage 
as a "human bomb" in an attempt to blow up a border police 
station in County Fermenaugh* The Tiroes reports that the 
woman, who worked at the station, was forced to carry the 
bomb in her handbag while her husband and child were held 
hostage. The bomb exploded minutes after it was delivered, 
but no one was injured. In October of 1990, six soldiers 
and a civilian died in similar "human bomb" attacks on 
military check points in Londonderry and Newry.8 
Assassinations 
Assassination is another effective strategy employed by 
terrorists. Assassination is not merely the murder of a 
high ranking official, but the slaying of any targeted 
person. Between 1972 and 1978 approximately 625 people were 
assassinated in Northern Ireland, however not all of them 
were victims of the PIRA. Some were victims of the Ulster 
Defense Force (UDF) and other Protestant paramilitary 
groups.9 
Assassinations are useful not only to eliminate the 
target, but also to warn others that holding similar 
positions, views, and attitudes could result in the same 
fate. 
Table 3.—Sectarian, Intrafractional, and Interfractional 
Assassinations from 1972-1978 in Northern Ireland 
Year Number Assassinated 
1972 122 
1973 87 
1974 95 
1975 144 
1976 121 
1977 42 
1978 14 
Source: Adrian Guelke, "Loyalist and Republican Perceptions 
of the Northern Ireland Conflict: The Ulster Defense Force 
and the Provisional IRA," chap, in Political Violence and 
Terror (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 
103, table 3. 
Assassination is an invaluable tactic against the 
elites, for the execution of prominent officials causes 
abundant fear and anxiety among those who either govern or 
support the government. The assassination of Lord 
Mountbatten by the Provos on August 27, 1979, garnered much 
media attention as international outcries of sorrow and rage 
poured forth. 
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Policemen in Northern Ireland are often PIRA 
assassination targets. Two were shot in the head in a 
crowded city center market in Belfast on July 1, 1990. The 
Times states that the PIRA claimed responsibility for the 
incident and the Superintendent of the RUC issued this 
statement of contempt: "Once again this demonstrated the 
utterly indiscriminate way these people go about their 
business."10 
Member of Parliament Ian Gow was the fourth sitting MP 
to be assassinated by the Provos when a car bomb exploded at 
his house on July 30, 1990. The Times reports that the name 
of the outspoken anti-IRA MP was found on a "hit list" in 
1989, and he was warned to take extra security measures to 
ensure his safety. The Provos said they assassinated Mr. 
Gow because he was "a close and personal associate of 
British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher," and because he 
wielded considerable political influence in the political 
affairs of Northern Ireland.11 
Contrary to the statement issued by the Superintendent 
of the RUC, the assassination of the two officers was not 
indiscriminate. They were shot because they were involved 
with the security forces in Northern Ireland and because the 
PIRA knew the murders would garner media attention. Lord 
Mountbatten, Ian Gow and the many others who have been PIRA 
victims were assassinated for similar reasons. Simply put, 
it furthered the Provisionals' goal of tactical success. 
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Hunger Strikes 
Although not detrimental to the lives of those 
uninvolved in a hunger strike, this tactic is used to garner 
support for those involved, mainly PIRA members, and capture 
worldwide media attention. The success of this tactic is 
debatable. It is true that initially a hunger strike will 
attract sympathizers and media attention, but that attention 
and sympathy usually fade as the hunger strikers perish. 
Sometimes however, a hunger strike can lead to negotiations 
and tactical success. 
As a result of a hunger strike in June 1972, the 
"special category" status was accorded those prisoners who 
were convicted of "political" crimes. In essence this meant 
that political prisoners, most of whom were PIRA and IRA 
members, were not required to wear prison uniforms, were 
allowed more visits and food parcels, and had better 
facilities than ordinary prisoners. This status was revoked 
in March 1976, prompting prisoners to go "on the blanket." 
They wore no clothes, and did no work, including cleaning 
themselves or their cells. This strategy was a failure, and 
the hunger strike resumed in October 1980. On March 1, 
1981, Bobby Sands, the commanding IRA officer within Maze 
prison began his hunger strike. He attempted, not only to 
regain special status, but to gather much needed popular 
support for the Provisionals. He died sixty-six days later, 
followed by nine others within three months. 
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Even though the hunger strike did not prompt the 
reintroduction of the special category status, one scholar 
believes that it was an unequivocal success. In Padraig 
O'Malley's words, it 
allowed the IRA to reestablish itself in the heroic 
mold and to reaffirm its legitimacy in the historical 
context, thereby making it more difficult to dismiss 
the IRA as mere terrorists with no political 
constituency and representative of nothing other than 
the fragmented dream of a demented few.12 
Desecration 
Another form of intimidation is the desecration of 
certain institutions, churches and especially government 
buildings. This form of terrorism is implicit, and is often 
a warning device which advertises future consequences if the 
present warning is not heeded. This warning can come in the 
form of graffiti and vandalism. Members of Provisional Sinn 
Fein, the political wing of the PIRA, have painted slogans 
advocating violence on the walls of many Belfast businesses. 
This form of terrorism is useful because of its simplicity. 
It requires no training or expertise, and the only necessary 
equipment is a can of spray paint. 
Members or sympathizers of both Protestant and Catholic 
paramilitary organizations painted graffiti on community 
walls during the hunger strikes in 1981. In Catholic areas 
elaborate murals began to appear, some depicting bearded 
hunger strikers in Christ-like images. One person painted 
"Blessed are those who hunger for justice," high on a gable 
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wall. Graffiti of quite opposite meaning appeared in 
several Protestant communities. "Let Bobby Sands Die," "Let 
Bobby Sands Rot in Hell," and "Don't be Vague, Starve a 
Taig," (taig is slang for Catholic) were written on walls in 
loyalist districts. 
Harassment 
Another tactic harassment of the enemy. Harassment can 
be either verbal or physical brutality. Although physical 
brutality is not a common trademark of the Provos, their 
sympathizers often verbally taunt soldiers and policemen and 
throw rocks, bottles, and sticks at them. This strategy is 
meant to invite retaliation, which it does, so the PIRA can 
justify its existence as protector of the Catholic minority 
and justify the further use of violence. 
On Easter Sunday, April 12, 1981, the PIRA held 
demonstrations and parades in several towns in Northern 
Ireland to show support for Bobby Sands. After the 
ceremonies were over in Londonderry a group of fifty 
teenagers began stoning policemen and soldiers. As the 
pelting continued, two army Land Rovers came speeding at the 
demonstrators at an estimated fifty miles per hour. The 
vehicles smashed into the crowd killing two boys. The 
Catholics of Derry and several members of the PIRA 
retaliated on April 14 and 15 by stealing and burning 
thirty-one cars and buses and lobbing acid bombs at the 
security forces. The retaliation of the soldiers made 
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martyrs of the boys and energized the crowd: in other 
words, the harassment was a success, despite the deaths of 
the youngsters. 
Kidnapping 
Ceremonial terrorism is another effective tactic. 
Kidnapping and hostage-taking fall into this category. It 
is mainly used as an attention-grabbing media event. 
Tactically, hostage taking is a good strategy. Hostages can 
be used for financial gain through extortion or a bartering 
tool for arms and ammunition. The possession of hostages 
may also guarantee safety for the terrorists. The 
government of the hostages will not employ large-scale 
violent methods of eliminating terrorists for fear of 
accidentally killing the hostages. With the exception of 
those hostages used for proxy bomb and human bomb purposes, 
the Provos have used kidnapping minimally. Between 1973 and 
1978, only eight people were kidnapped, six in the United 
Kingdom, and two in the Republic. 
PIRA Targets 
Targets of the PIRA are not chosen at random. To 
reiterate, these people are chosen to meet specific goals of 
intimidation. This violence is sometimes viewed as 
primarily sectarian, but that is not the case because the 
Provos target only those who will serve their purpose, 
mainly government officials or members of the security 
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forces. Unfortunately, accidents happen, and the 
Provisionals have admitted sorrow when a child is caught by 
an explosion or in the cross-fire. Certain buildings such 
as bus terminals, train stations, and army buildings are 
also targeted by the Provos. 
Civilian casualties are very common in Northern 
Ireland. According to a study done by Michael McKeown, 
there were 1,163 civilians killed due to the strife in 
Ulster from 1968 to 1980.11 One household in fifteen had 
been touched by the disturbances. The Provos alone are not 
to blame for this high rate of death though. The Royal 
Ulster Constabulary, the Ulster Defense Force (UDF), and the 
British military all have contributed to the high casualty 
rate. The Protestant paramilitaries have largely been a 
reactive force* Barry White, in 11 From Conflict to 
Violence," states that 
the Unionists have a siege mentality and they regard 
any challenge to the status quo as subversive, and a 
cause for retaliation. This has led them to indulge in 
openly sectarian attacks [and] to terrorize the 
Catholic population.14 
An instance of Catholics becoming PIRA targets occurred 
around 1972 as they were "persuaded" to leave the UDF. At 
the insistence of the Provos, the number of Catholics 
involved in the UDF dropped from eighteen percent in 1972 to 
an insignificant two percent in 1980. Catholics who are 
suspected informants are readily assassinated, as are those 
disloyal to the cause. 
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Areas where many people gather are easily targeted. 
Although "not authorized," the PIRA claimed responsibility 
for a car bomb which exploded outside Herrod's department 
store in London on December 18, 1983. Six people including 
two policemen were killed, and seventy-seven people were 
injured. On February 14, 1991, the Provos claimed 
responsibility for bombing the Victoria and Paddington train 
stations, killing one man and injuring forty other persons. 
The first bomb exploded at Paddington station at 4:20 am, 
causing extensive damage to the roof, but hurting no one. 
The second bomb detonated at 7:40 am, just as the morning 
rush hour was beginning. A platform full of commuters was 
violently rocked, sending those people into an instant 
panic. As The Times of London states, "had the device, 
containing 7 lbs of explosives, gone off twenty minutes 
later, there would probably have been three times as many 
casualties. 
Prominent members in the British government are also 
targeted for execution by the Provisionals. Prime Minister 
John Major and his War Cabinet, meeting at 10 Downing 
Street, London, were the targets of a mortar attack on 
February 7, 1991. Four people were slightly injured, and 
numbers 10, 11, and 12 Downing Street all somewhat damaged 
as windows shattered and outer walls were scorched. This 
particular attack was a decisive victory for the PIRA as 
they have never come so close to 10 Downing Street, and they 
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had never before used mortars in Britain. The attack was 
easily carried out because the mortars were launched from an 
abandoned van parked in front of the Prime Minister's 
residence. Professor Paul Wilkinson, an expert on 
terrorism, was quoted as saying: 
the bombing highlighted the IRA's ability to deliver 
blows that were psychologically and physically 
damaging. Attacking 10 Downing Street had obviously 
great propaganda value; but the physical threat had 
been shown to be very real.16 
Although most assassinations of military personnel take 
place in Northern Ireland or England, the Provos have by no 
means limited themselves to those areas. In 1989 a Royal 
Air Force Corporal stationed in Germany was assassinated by 
the Provos. He was not alone when gunmen targeted him, and 
his six-month-old daughter was also killed. The IRA said it 
expressed "profound regret for killing the child."17 
The group which has taken the brunt of PIRA assassina­
tions is the combined security forces in Northern Ireland. 
Between 1974 and 1980, 131 British soldiers had been killed, 
most by shooting or bombing attacks. Between 1970 and 1986, 
377 members of the RUC and the UDF were murdered by 
terrorists, and over 6,000 were injured. The same day that 
Lord Mountbatten was assassinated, August 27, 1979, the 
Provos killed eighteen members of the British Army south of 
Belfast. As three trucks filled with soldiers passed by a 
vehicle carrying a stack of hay, a bomb, hidden in the hay, 
was detonated by remote control from a nearby bush. 
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On November 2, 1991, two soldiers were killed, six 
injured, and four civilians injured during a bomb attack on 
the military wing of a Belfast hospital. It was the first 
bomb attack on a hospital since the beginning of the present 
troubles in 1968. The Times reports that the PIRA claimed 
responsibility and said that the intended target was not the 
civilian portion of the hospital, but what it called "the 
British Army base next to it," referring to the military 
wing.18 
Internal Machinery of the Provisional IRA 
Organization 
The organization of the Provisional IRA has changed 
considerably over the years. Before 1977, it was organized 
on a neighborhood basis. Padraig O'Malley says that "the 
structure was hierarchical—brigades, battalions, and 
companies drew their members from the neighborhoods in which 
they would operate."19 
This structure made the movement highly accessible, 
causing much infiltration and high rates of arrest for those 
suspected of terrorist activities. By the mid 1970s the 
Provos had fifteen hundred members, six hundred of whom were 
in Belfast. In 1977, the group reorganized into cellular 
units. These very active units consist of three or four 
members drawn from different neighborhoods. Each unit is 
specialized in its tactical performance; rarely does an 
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explosives unit use guns, and vice versa. Information is 
disseminated on a "need to know basis", and only one member 
is given advance instructions. This new organization has 
made the Provos less dependent on public support and less 
vulnerable to informers. In 1988, there were no more than 
forty active gunmen in the North, supported by approximately 
150 volunteers. There were only eight brigades operating 
from "The North command."20 
Membership 
Membership is highly selective in the PIRA. A recruit 
may be scrutinized for up to a year before being allowed to 
join. Hard drinkers and loud individuals are readily 
dismissed. Brigadier James Glover, who was the General 
Commanding Officer of British forces in Northern Ireland, 
was quoted as saying, "The PIRA is essentially a working-
class organization based in the ghetto areas of the cities 
and in the poor rural areas."21 
Contrary to popular theory, the Provos are not made up 
of the dregs of society. Recruitment is fairly easy, young 
men and women who grew up in the violent areas on Northern 
Ireland often aspire to become full-time terrorists, and 
there is a steady stream of dedicated and embittered 
terrorists being released from prison. The prisons 
themselves have a command structure and classes where 
terrorists can learn "everything from republicanism to 
weaponry."22 
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Arms and Financial Support 
Armament and financial support for terrorist movements 
comes from many sources. Dr. Michael McKinley in the essay 
"The Irish Republican Army and Terror International" claims 
that by 1973, "at least 282 types of weapons had been 
discovered [belonging to PIRA members] representing fifteen 
countries of origin."23 Czechoslovakian explosives and 
pistols, and Soviet-made rifles, hand-grenades and rocket 
launchers are among the large cache of armament in PIRA 
possession. 
In the 1970s, the Libyan government of Colonel Mu•ammar 
al-Qaddafi and the Palestine Liberation Organization also 
sent shipments of arms to the Provos. In October 1987, a 
ship was seized carrying 150 tons of weapons from Libya to 
Northern Ireland. Included in the cargo were surface-to-air 
missiles, mortar shells, rocket launchers, and Semtex high 
explosive.24 
By 1974, the Provisionals were armed with California-
made armelite AR130's and variants of the American military 
Ml carbine and AR1S semi-automatic weapons. The Provos even 
had a few American military M60 fully-automatic machine guns 
which were presumed stolen from a National Guard Armory in 
Danvers, MA. In addition, explosives were readily diverted 
to Northern Ireland by sympathizers working on the New York 
City water tunnel in the 1970s. Arms also came from 
sympathizers in Canada and the Irish Northern Aid Committee 
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(NORAID), based in the United States, who sent rifles, hand 
guns, and ammunition.25 
Financial aid comes from NORAID as well. From 1969 to 
1981, at least $1,971,796 was sent to IRA officials in 
Northern Ireland. However, unofficial NORAID sources have 
boasted of sending as much as $5 million to the IRA over 
that same eleven years. One anonymous NORAID representative 
was quoted in 1971 as saying: 
Our job is to get up the money and send it to the 
people over there. What they use it for is up to them. 
We attach no strings. Everything we do in this country 
is aimed at assisting the final phase of the struggle 
for freedom in Ireland.26 
In 1975 NORAID claimed to have eighty chapters in the United 
States with approximately two thousand members nationwide. 
The largest concentrations are in Boston, New York City, 
Chicago, Philadelphia, San Francisco, and other large cities 
across the country. By 1989, however, donations had dropped 
off to an estimated $175,000 annually. 
The IRA and the Provisional IRA have interior financial 
capabilities as well. In the early 1970s they ran 
extensive protection rackets involving local shop owners, 
publicans (pub owners) and industrialists. James Adams, in 
his essay "The Financing of Terror," believes that "every 
major business in [Northern Ireland] has been sucked into 
the protection racket."27 The organization legitimized the 
protection by claiming that it was merely a security firm. 
John DeLorean, former owner of the defunct DeLorean Motor 
60 
Company, was one of the many who "employed" the security 
firm.28 
One semi-legitimate operation the IRA and the Provos 
run is their taxi service. It began in 1972 with five 
"black cabs" purchased in London. Shortly thereafter the 
IRA stoned and bombed the city-run bus service in Belfast 
destroying over three hundred buses. The IRA replaced the 
bus service with six hundred cabs, two garages, and eighteen 
full-time employees. In 1986, the IRA's taxi companies, 
Falls Taxis and Peoples Taxis, had approximately 350 cabs, 
eight full-time employees, and claimed assets in excess of 
one million pounds. 
Other activities to raise money for the IRA and PIRA 
include fraud on building sites, the sale of legal and 
illegal alcohol in Northern Ireland's night clubs and armed 
robbery. In 1973 they stole $42,000 from various Belfast 
banks.29 Counterfeit money is another illegal activity in 
which the IRA participates. 
In September 1988, $2 million in American counterfeit 
currency was seized in Dublin. On February 7, 1989, an IRA 
operative was arrested in New York City for attempting to 
smuggle over $13,000 in counterfeit bills into the United 
States. Irish authorities claim the money was intended to 
pay for IRA and PIRA operations. The Times reports that in 
1989 the PIRA and IRA generated ten million pounds from 
"mafia-style operations ranging from protection rackets, 
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extortion and armed robbery to fraud, smuggling and drug 
dealing."30 
From these various attempts to maintain financial and 
organizational stability, one can draw a picture of a well-
organized, established group which intends to keep fighting 
for its goals at all costs. 
Representation by the PIRA 
The Provisional IRA professes to have the long-term 
well-being of the Catholic minority at heart when it uses 
terrorism to attain its goals. They believe that they are 
the voice of the minority and have its full support and 
cooperation. They view themselves as protectors of the 
people and defenders of the cause. 
The role of the Provisionals in Catholic ghettos is 
more than mere representative and protector however. They 
are a quasi-security force who act as policemen and often 
punish those Catholics found guilty of crimes against their 
neighbors. These "ghetto laws" are often issued through 
directives pushed through residents' mail slots or warnings 
painted on walls in the district. 
John Conroy, an American journalist who periodically 
spent time in Northern Ireland from 1977-1985, says that 
residents are allowed to rob a bank or post office, but only 
to support the movement. Stealing from a neighbor is 
forbidden, but stealing from the government is allowed and 
even encouraged. Teenagers are not allowed to steal cars or 
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trucks, except during riots when they are used as 
barricades. During a riot one may steal a bus, but not a 
black taxi. 
Policemen are legitimate targets anywhere, anytime, of 
abuse, harassment, stones, bombs, and bullets. Firemen, 
however, are always immune. For store owners, dealing in 
smuggled goods is permissible, dealing in stolen goods is 
forbidden. Inebriation is acceptable behavior, as is the 
taking of valium. Serving liquor to a minor is an offense, 
as is the use of heroin. Rape is a crime with swift and 
often severe consequences.31 
Punishment is meted out according to the severity of 
the crime. After the first offense one is always given a 
verbal warning; beyond that punishment is usually swift and 
very painful. The Provos' sentence is "kneecapping." This 
is the practice of shooting an offender in the knee. A 
light sentence is a bullet through the fleshy part of the 
thigh. A heavy sentence results in the destruction of bones 
and arteries. These sentences range from the shooting of 
one leg to both legs, and even both arms and legs, also 
called "the silver cross." Conroy maintains that between 
1973 and 1985 there were 1,110 kneecappings.32 If an 
offender fails to forego his errant ways, he is executed. 
Like the offenses, there are guidelines to punishments. 
Women are never kneecapped and those offenders under sixteen 
are beaten, but rarely shot. If the parents of a youngster 
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are deemed irresponsible, either the father is beaten or 
both parents are banned from local pubs. While popular in 
the early 1970s, the Provos have abandoned the practice of 
tarring and feathering, and no longer douse offenders with 
paint or diesel oil. 
Conroy maintains that the Provisionals relied primarily 
on kneecapping in 1980 to keep the community in line. It 
does not always work however and some people are kneecapped 
on more than one occasion. Andy Tyrie, the leader of the 
UDA, maintains that the fear instilled by the Provos "never 
works if it occurs over a period of time. People get used 
to being threatened."33 The PIRA continues to kneecap 
Catholic residents because he ghetto needs policing, and if 
they did not do it, the people would eventually turn to the 
RUC. Conroy claims that "acceptance of the police would 
ultimately result in the rejection of the IRA."34 
Adrian Guelke, in "Loyalist and Republican Perceptions 
of the Northern Ireland Conflict," claims that the 
Provisionals are losing support because they can not protect 
Catholic residents from the sectarian and random killings by 
the Protestant paramilitaries.35 
Support in the South is also lacking. Northern 
Catholics are often seen as their own worst enemies: 
petulant, demanding, and insistent. People in the rest of 
Great Britain are generally disinclined to concentrate 
heavily on the problems of Northern Ireland, again because 
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they view it as a distinctively Irish problem. Michael 
McKinley, a professor of political science at the Australian 
National University, maintains that "disunity and a 
revulsion against the violence in both Northern Ireland and 
the mainland ensured [PIRA] rejection by the majority of the 
Irish [Catholic] community in Britain, who felt its standing 
was endangered."36 
Condemnation of the violent tactics of the IRA and PIRA 
comes from the Catholic Church regularly. The IRA was 
formally condemned first in 1931 and again in 1956, and 
since 1972, the condemnations have been increasingly harsh 
and frequent. The righteousness of the cause transcended 
even the impassioned pleas of Pope John Paul II when he 
visited Northern Ireland in 1979 and begged for the 
cessation of the violence. 
There is, of course, a firm lack of support from the 
Protestants of the North, and in fact, the violence of the 
Provos, only furthers Protestant hate and discrimination. 
The Provos have demonstrated, however, that they are 
organizationally sound and do not need popular support to 
carry forth their tactical objectives. One expert estimates 
that the PIRA can function with as little as three percent 
support from the Catholic population.37 
Strategic Goals 
The strategic goals of the PIRA seem fluid, shifting 
with political and social change in Northern Ireland. 
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Richard Clutterbuck claims that the Provisionals do not have 
any detectable political ideology and are motivated solely 
by nationalist aims. One report says the objective is to 
unify Ireland under a vaguely defined form of socialism; 
another claims the Provos have a Marxist-Leninist bent. 
Padraig O'Malley says that the campaign is an effort to get 
the British troops to withdraw from Northern Ireland, so the 
North can reunite with the South. Mark Findlay argues that 
the movement was a reaction not to British military pre­
sence, but to blatant economic deprivation and "discrimina­
tion in the provision of housing and employment" in Northern 
Ireland.38 
A united Ireland is not an outlandish goal for the 
Provisionals. The citizens of Britain and the Republic 
consistently endorse some form of reunification. However, 
neither group is willing to make concessions to help bring 
about a peacefully united Ireland. Citizens of the Republic 
are unwilling to pay higher taxes to initiate reunification, 
and British citizens remain aloof, claiming that the Irish 
problem should stay in Ireland. 
As a matter of fact, public opinion polls have shown 
that violence in Northern Ireland has little effect on 
British sentiment, and violence in Britain raises only 
minimal concern among the citizens. Furthermore, even 
though Ulster Protestants see themselves as British, instead 
of Irish, the feeling is not necessarily reciprocated. 
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Troop withdrawal is a seemingly simplistic goal of the 
Provos, however some would argue to contrary. A survey has 
found that fifty-nine percent of people in the Republic 
believe that troop withdrawal without the consent of both 
societies in the North would result in increased violence. 
Speculations have been made that a full withdrawal 
would leave Northern Ireland in the hands of the 
professional Protestant army and police force whose 
membership would range from five to fifteen thousand. This 
scenario anticipates that Catholics would flee to the 
Republic, creating an immense refugee problem. The 
Provisionals and the Official IRA would appear as protectors 
and defenders of the remaining Catholics in the North. 
Recruitment would skyrocket as would financial support from 
the Republic, sympathizers abroad, and especiallyf Irish— 
Americans. The Republic would stand firm in their quest to 
protect Catholic communities along the border and perhaps 
aspire to regain all six counties of Ulster. The North and 
South in essence would be on the brink of civil war. 
O'Malley maintains that withdrawal would irrevocably 
strengthen the position of the IRA and that 
there is, therefore, no case for unilateral withdrawal 
unless, of course, it is assumes the Protestants would 
accept that British withdrawal made unification 
inevitable, and that rather than fight the inevitable 
they would bow to it.39 
The chances of the Protestants giving up without a fight is 
highly unlikely. 
67 
The only viable strategic goal remaining then is the 
end of Protestant domination in employment, housing and 
government in Northern Ireland—the original goal of the 
protests in the late 1960s. This goal too, however, may be 
out of reach. The process of enlightenment from religious 
and social constraints and barriers is a long and arduous 
process. As seen in the United States, as well as Ireland, 
the conflicts which accompany racial and religious 
inequality and discrimination are numerous. Some might say 
even too numerous to comprehend, let alone solve. Religious 
divisions date back eight hundred years in Ireland. The 
walls of discrimination are built upon the solid foundations 
of Protestant industrialism and Catholic agrarianism. 
Religious affiliation divisions are central to political and 
social polarization, perpetuating employment and income 
discrimination. Discrimination will be further analyzed and 
evaluated in the next chapter. 
Conclusion 
This chapter was based on James Rule's statement that 
"the objectives and targets of militant collective action 
[will] reflect pursuit of long term collective interest of 
the groups represented in the action. The significant 
feature with the PIRA is that they only have an estimated 
one-third of all Catholic support in Ulster for their 
strategic goals. In 1981, the population in the North was 
approximately 1,750,000 persons. Only one-third of those 
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are Catholic, roughly 580,000. Of those 580,000 Catholics, 
a mere one-third fully support the tactical and strategic 
objectives of the Provos, only 19 0,000 people. 
Rule's hypothesis, however, is still correct because 
these 190,000 people form the group represented by the IRA 
and PIRA; these are the men and women who want an immediate 
withdrawal of all British troops and reunification with the 
Republic. These people support the tactical objectives of 
intimidation as the only method of attaining the strategic 
goals of withdrawal and reunification. O'Malley's 
contention that the group can survive with only three 
percent popular support is, therefore, not outlandish. 
Survival and tactical success, however, are vastly different 
from strategic success. Although the Provisionals are 
tactically successful every time another bomb explodes, they 
are no closer to strategic success. 
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CHAPTER 4 
DISCRIMINATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND 
There is much controversy surrounding the situation in 
Northern Ireland. One of the most controversial aspects of 
the troubles falls in the realm of discrimination. This 
chapter focuses on perceived discrimination against the 
Catholic minority by the Protestant majority, Northern 
Ireland government and British government; however, it will 
also study the Protestant viewpoint of the allegations of 
discrimination. 
Padraig O'Malley argues that the Protestant government 
of Northern Ireland 
demanded that all Catholics be viewed as subversives 
and all Catholic actions interpreted in that context; 
any compromise with Catholics in a political sense was 
seen as potentially undermining Protestant hegemony. 
The result: widespread discrimination against 
Catholics, especially for jobs and housing; keeping 
their numbers down by keeping their emigration up; 
stereotyping; and a society that put the utmost premium 
on spatial divisions that developed along close 
communal lines, and in which religion became the badge 
of political allegiance.1 
Several authors contend that there is very little 
discrimination by Protestants, and their opinions will also 
be considered. Housing discrimination will be reviewed 
first, followed by employment and income discrimination, and 
finally the disparity in the education system. 
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Several steps have been taken to rectify the 
discrimination that plagues Ulster. Equal housing and 
employment laws have been enacted, and integration is being 
tested as a means to end educational disparity. In 1976 the 
Fair Employment Act made discrimination based on political 
or religious beliefs illegal and created the Fair Employment 
Agency (FEA). 
The goal of this chapter is to study the prevalence of 
discrimination in Northern Ireland. Further, an attempt 
will be made to study the reaction of the Provisional Irish 
Republican Army to the perceived discrimination against the 
Catholic residents. In addition, an analysis of the 
Protestant reaction to the civil rights movement of the late 
1960s and early 1970s and the PIRA will be made. It will be 
proposed that the PIRA has done little to quell 
discrimination against Catholics because they perpetuate the 
Protestant and government notions of Catholic disloyalty and 
distrust. 
A major contention among those who study the situation 
in Northern Ireland, and those who live in Northern Ireland 
is the amount of discrimination against Catholics. The 
differences arise in assessing perceived discrimination 
versus actual discrimination. Thomas E. Hachey claims that 
throughout recent history, "Ulster's Roman Catholics have 
shared a plight similar to that of blacks in the United 
States, as they have been routinely denied their civil 
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rights and have been discriminated against in education, 
housing and jobs."2 Christopher Hewitt, in "Discrimination 
in Northern Ireland," argues however that although 
discrimination against Catholics has occurred, "the extent 
and severity of this discrimination have been greatly 
exaggerated."3 
This chapter examines four types of discrimination: 
housing, employment, income and education. A description of 
the violations, as well as their proposed remedies, is 
necessary to show that steps have been taken to end 
discrimination. The purpose is to show that efforts to end 
sectarian discrimination have failed for the most part. 
Bill Rolston, a Sociologist at Ulster Polytechnic, 
claims that the reforms made in the 197 0s may not be fully 
recognized and implemented due to radical republican 
ideology and rejection of the very government which enacted 
those civil rights laws.4 
Housing Discrimination 
Before the civil rights movement of the late 1960s, 
public housing was in the jurisdiction of local councils: 
councils run by Protestant officials. Twenty-six percent of 
all Catholics in Ulster lived in public housing. In 
Northern Ireland: A Report on the Conflict, written by The 
London Sunday Times Insight Team, it is claimed that the 
local councils discriminated against Catholics in several 
ways. One was to put Protestants in better houses than 
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Catholics, but charge the same rents. In Dungannon, for 
exactly the same amount of rent, a Catholic on Ballygawley 
Road estate got forty-two square feet less space than a 
Protestant in the exclusive Cunningham's Lane estate. 
Another tactic was simply to house more Protestants 
than Catholics. Of the 1,598 houses built by Fermenaugh 
County Council between 1945 and 1969, 1,021 went to 
Protestant families. A third practice was to refuse to 
house Catholics except in areas where other Catholics 
already lived. Derry before 1969 actually reduced its 
housing program rather that let Catholics cross the boundary 
of the Catholic South Ward. Omagh and Dungannon practiced 
this system as well. An added feature was the strengthening 
of the local electoral arrangements. Catholics were 
prevented from living in Protestant wards, thus, the system 
perpetuated itself in the Protestant dominated council 
system.5 
Christopher Hewitt, in "Catholic Grievances, Catholic 
Nationalism and Violence in Northern Ireland During the 
Civil Rights Period," maintains that Protestant 
discrimination against Catholics was undeniable, however, 
"Catholic councils also discriminated."6 In Newry, a 
Catholic governed council allocated 743 council houses to 
Catholics, and only 22 to Protestants. Awareness of such 
discrimination, Hewitt claims, "was widespread among 
Northern Irish Protestants."7 He claims further that 
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discrimination by Protestant councils had little impact on 
Catholics and that "the greatest bias appeared to lie in the 
treatment of Protestants by Catholic councils."8 
Table 4.—Allocation of Employment and Housing by Council 
Type. 
Whole 
Prots 
Province 
Caths 
Prot. 
Prots 
Coun. 
Caths 
Cath. 
Prots 
Coun. 
Caths 
% living in 
council homes 20.6 25.9 20.6 25.9 20.4 40. 6 
% working for 
council 5.6 4.3 5.7 4 .1 3.7 5.3 
Source: Christopher Hewitt, "Catholic Grievances, Catholic 
Nationalism and Violence in Northern Ireland During the 
Civil Rights Period: A Reconsideration," The British 
Journal of Sociology 32 (September 1981): 367, table 2. 
A conventional thought is that Protestant discrimina­
tion against Catholics in the area of housing was a great 
catalyst for mass support of the Northern Ireland Civil 
Rights Association (NICRA). New York Times reporter Peter 
Maas concluded that one of the many catalysts for the civil 
rights movement was the jumping of a single, Protestant 
woman over ten Catholic families in line for public 
housing.9 However, when Catholics were asked if they 
expected "to be treated fairly in dealing with the local 
council," only ten percent of those living in Protestant 
dominated council areas said they expected unfair treatment. 
A similar response was received from those living in 
Catholic council areas.10 
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In a 1969 "new deal" package set up to reduce 
discrimination, housing matters were transferred from the 
local to the national authority. That reform policy was 
rejected in 1970 by the Unionist Party in Ulster. Unionists 
believed that formation of a central authority would deprive 
local authorities of a voice in the building and allocation 
of houses in its constituencies. The London Times. however, 
quoted the Minister of Development as saying that "the vote 
would not change the Government's plans. There would be no 
going back."11 
The central housing authority was officially created in 
July, 197 0, by the Northern Ireland Housing Executive Bill. 
This proposal created a nine-man decision-making executive 
body and a council to represent the population in all parts 
of Northern Ireland and report to the executive. 
Although some of the housing discrimination was 
alleviated, a 1973 study for the Northern Ireland Community 
Relations Commission identified "twelve areas in Belfast 
which [were] black spots in relation to overcrowding. All 
of these [were] Catholic areas."12 Hewitt maintains however 
that overcrowding in Catholic areas is not due to 
discrimination, but to "larger family size and massive 
population movements after the communal rioting."13 
In 1980 there were over 500 complaints made to the 
Northern Ireland Commissioner for Complaints regarding the 
Housing Executive. Bill Rolston states that "452 cases were 
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investigated, but of these a judgement of maladministration 
was made in only 23 cases (5 percent)."14 
Paul Arthur maintains, in "Negotiating the Northern 
Ireland Problem," that in 1986, 1,118 families were driven 
from their homes in the immediate aftermath of the signing 
of the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1985. "Almost all [were] the 
result of loyalists attacking Catholics."15 
A May 27, 1988 New York Times article further outlines 
the sectarian discrimination in North Belfast. Protestant 
gangs successfully prevented Catholics from occupying five 
refurbished homes in the Protestant district. Only one 
Catholic family remained in the loyalist enclave. They have 
lived there for thirty-two years, and Bernhard Murphy, the 
70 year old home owner said, "I'm not a fighting man, not a 
bit tough, but I'm not leaving."16 The Murphy's home had 
recently been the target of three fire-bombs, thrown by 
angry Protestants who believed that the area belonged in 
strictly Protestant hands. 
It would be foolhardy to claim that there were no 
attacks on Protestants who lived in Catholic-dominated 
areas. Children in both areas have been seen throwing 
stones and bottles into the neighborhoods of their nemesis. 
John Conroy argues that the difference that Catholic 
paramilitary groups target the government and the opposing 
factions of that government, while Protestant paramilitaries 
target Catholic civilians as well as suspected terrorists.17 
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Discrimination in housing has been largely eliminated 
by the Housing Executive, and the quality of housing has 
greatly improved. However, housing discrimination has not 
been totally eradicated in Northern Ireland. The 
Protestant-run Housing Executive is easily able to cover up 
any discrimination because the Commissioner for Complaints 
rarely finds maladministration in the cases brought to its 
attention. The loyalists in Northern Ireland do not want 
Catholics living in their midst, and Catholics do not want 
the Protestants within their communal boundaries. The 
twenty foot high concrete and barbed wire "peace line" that 
separates the two communities in Belfast is testimony to 
this phenomenon. 
Job and Income Discrimination 
Job and income discrepancy remains the most perceived 
civil rights violation in Northern Ireland. Jonathan Kelley 
and Ian McAllister suggest that income disparity in 1968 was 
due primarily to discrimination. 
In 1968 a Catholic family equal in family background, 
occupation and education to a Protestant family, could 
have expected to receive two pounds and ten schillings 
less per week. This represents only 88% of the average 
Protestant family income—a real and significant 
disadvantage.18 
According to Denis O'Hearn in "Catholic Grievances, Catholic 
Nationalism," there is "overwhelming evidence from the 1971 
census that discrimination in employment was the normal 
state of affairs."19 In 1970 there were only 400 Catholics 
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among 10,000 workers at the Harland and Wolff shipyards, the 
provinces single largest employer. Furthermore, Catholics 
"numbered only a handful in the workforces of the two major 
factories located in Catholic area of Belfast—Mackies and 
Sirocco Engineering Works."20 Unemployment among Catholics 
in 1971 was two and one-half times that of Protestants. 
Further, most Catholics are relegated to unskilled or semi­
skilled labor positions, while Protestants are employed in 
skilled labor, managerial, and government positions. 
Christopher Hewitt writes that "one genuine economic 
grievance of the Catholics was, and is, their higher rate of 
unemployment.1121 He argues however, that economic 
differences between Catholics and Protestants are not 
necessarily an indication of discrimination, but instead are 
due to the differences in education received by Protestants 
and Catholics in Ulster. 
Joseph Lee, in Ireland 1912-1985. observes that in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s Catholics became more aware of 
the occupational discrimination facing them, especially in 
the civil service. However, he concurs with Hewitt when he 
states that "Catholic perceptions of discrimination were no 
doubt exaggerated. But the reality was bad enough."22 In 
the civil service in 1972 approximately 95% of senior 
officials were Protestants and only one Catholic had risen 
through the ranks to hold the position of Secretary of a 
Department.23 Hewitt maintains also that most 
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discrimination was practiced in the area of government 
employment. He justifies this discrimination by stating 
that "since a sizeable section of the Catholic community 
opposed the very existence of the Northern Irish state it is 
hardly surprising that they were denied government 
employment."24 
Hewitt also maintains that Catholics and Protestants 
are in different sectors of the economy and different kinds 
of occupations. "In and of themselves," he states, "[these 
differences] are not proof of discrimination (unless one 
wishes to argue that the remarkable over-representation of 
Catholic publicans is a sign of anti-Protestant bias in the 
liquor trade?)"25 
It is exactly this sort of flip attitude that gives 
rise to continued sectsirisn differences snd fuirtheirs 
disparities in Northern Ireland. Unfortunately this 
attitude often prevails, and Catholics are regarded as 
lower-class people who would rather sit in a pub all day 
than go to work. One rarely hears of the "Catholic work-
ethic," but we are constantly inundated with the idea of the 
"Protestant work-ethic." Many would argue however, that 
there is little difference in the attitude toward hard work 
between Catholics and Protestants. 
Michael Hout, in a paper entitled, "Opportunity and the 
Minority Middle Class: A Comparison of Blacks in the United 
States and Catholics in Northern Ireland," studies the 1971 
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United Kingdom census and the 1974 Office of Population 
Consensus and Survey in Northern Ireland to get a clear 
picture of the extent of discrimination in the region. He 
concludes that the differences between Catholics and 
Protestants are very clearly divided between community and 
big business. 
Catholics are underrepresented in professional 
occupations relative to the representation enjoyed by 
Protestants. Furthermore, Catholics are overrepresented at 
the bottom of the socioeconomec hierarchy, especially in the 
laborer category. The concentration of Catholics exceedes 
that of Protestants by more than one percentage point in 
acting, nursing, teaching and the clergy. Protestants, on 
the other hand, are more likely to work in the fields of 
drafting, engineering and accounting. 
While Protestants dominate among the managers in mining 
and production, Catholics are concentrated in the ownership 
of retail shops, bars and inns. Within the skilled manual 
labor category, Protestants dominate as millwrights, fitters 
and machine erectors, as well as supervisory positions. 
Hout contends that shipbuilding is the most important heavy 
industry in Northern Ireland and Protestants have long 
dominated the workforce. The service industry is heavily 
dominated by Catholics in the positions of hairdressers, 
bartenders and cooks, while police and security guards are 
predominately Protestant.26 
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Table 5.—Selected Occupations that Contribute to 
Dissimilarity Within Major Occupational Groups by 
Ascriptive Group (Entries are percentages within the 
major occupational group.) 
Occupation Catholic Protestant 
Professionals and Technicians 
Accountants 
Actors, Stage Managers, 
Entertainers, Musicians 
Clergymen 
Draftsmen 
Engineers 
Nurses 
Primary and Secondary School 
Teachers 
Managers, Owners, and Proprietors 
Managers, mining and production 
Proprietors and Managers, retail 
Managers, other 
Publicans, Innkeepers 
Craftsmen and Foremen 
Foreman, manual 
Millwrights and Fitters, Machine 
Erectors 
2.9 
1.9 
8.1 
3 
2 
8 
32.4 
5.1 
44.1 
5.5 
16. 3 
11. 1 
9.9 
4.4 
.7 
5.8 
7.5 
10.9 
2.3 
19.4 
12.2 
38. 1 
13.6 
1.8 
15.5 
19.2 
Service Workers 
Bartenders 
Cook 
Hairdressers 
Police, Constables 
Security Guards 
22.0 
7.9 
6 
7 
14.8 
4 
2 
2 
28 
24 
Source: Michael Hout, "Opportunity and the Minority Middle 
Class: A Comparison of Blacks in the United States and 
Catholics in Northern Ireland," American Sociological Review 
51 (April 1986): 218, table 2. 
Hout argues that these data 
disclose something about the process stratifying the 
minority groups. It shows how the existence of 
segregation gives rise to ecological niches conductive 
to the growth of ethnic specialties in employment.27 
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Denis O'Hearn in "Again on Discrimination in the North 
of Ireland," states that while Protestants hold managerial 
and professional positions that serve the community as a 
whole, Catholics tend to serve their own community. 
Furthermore, 56% of non-managerial jobs held by Catholics 
are filled by women who are nurses, teachers, shop-clerks, 
or waitresses. These jobs offer little advancement and the 
women tend to quit when they marry. O'Hearn continues, 
Even within an occupation, such as dock-workers, we 
find Protestants employed in cross-channel docks where 
there is more work and better pay, while Catholics are 
forced to work in the deep sea docks, where 
occupational conditions and status are much lower.28 
Income disparity is also quite prevalent in Ulster. A 
study done by Jonathan Kelley and Ian McAllister shows that 
in 1968 the average Catholic family equal in family 
background, occupation and education to a Protestant family 
received two pounds and ten schillings less per week. 
"These differences in incomes could be interpreted as the 
direct result of religious discrimination against Catholics, 
with Catholics simply being paid less than Protestants in 
the same jobs."29 
The London Sunday Times Insight Team state that in 
Londonderry in 1966 the heads of all City Council 
departments were Protectant. Furthermore, "of 177 salaried 
employees, 145 - earning a total of 124,424 pounds per 
year - were Protestant, and only 32 - earning a total of 
20,420 pounds per year - were Catholic." On average in the 
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Derry City Council Protestants earned 858 pounds per year, 
Catholics earned 638 pounds.30 
David E. Schmitt, a political science professor at 
Northeastern University, reports that in 1976, a British 
Minister for Northern Ireland said that job discrimination 
"is a very large problem indeed, and let nobody think 
otherwise.1,31 In 1976 the Fair Employment Act made 
discrimination on the grounds of religious or political 
belief illegal and established the Fair Employment Agency . 
The FEA was developed on the premise that its tasks 
would include the investigation of individual complaints of 
discrimination and the investigation of the practices of 
specific organizations and employers. Unfortunately, many 
discrimination claims are never reported. Those who 
contemplate fxlxng claxxns often do not for fear of reprxsals 
or because they believe nothing will be done. Of those 
reported, many are not investigated because they fall 
outside the FEA's jurisdiction, or they lack evidence to 
warrant investigation. Of those complaintants deemed to 
have a prima facie case of discrimination, many do not last 
the course of the filing process because the bureaucratic 
hurdles are too many, a fact which the FEA itself 
acknowledges. 
Qualitative questions add further burden of proof to 
discrimination claims: how is one to judge whether 
discrimination has occurred or not, and if the motive was 
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based on religious or political bias? Bill Rolston concedes 
that "as a result of these quantitative and qualitative 
factors, very few findings of unlawful discrimination have 
been made by the FEA."32 
Table 6.—Complaints on Which Decisions have been taken by 
the FEA, April 1, 1977 to March 31, 1982 (Source FEA 
Annual Reports) 
Organization or Employer Discrimination No Discrimination 
Government Departments 0 24 
Local Authorities 6 9 
Education and Library 
Boards 0 16 
Health and Social Services 
Boards 2 15 
Other Public Boards 0 14 
Food, Drink and Tobacco 
Industry 1 12 
Chemical and Allied Industries 1 12 
Engineering Industries 0 13 
Textiles and Clothing 1 8 
Manufacturing Industries g 
Construction Industries 2 6 
Transport 0 2 
Distributive Trades 0 9 
Other Businesses 0 8 
Total 13 144 
Source: Bill Rolston, "Reformism and Sectarianism: The 
State of the Union after Civil Rights," chap, in Northern 
Ireland: The Background to the Conflict, ed. John Darby 
(Belfast: Appletree Press, 1983) 205, table 9:1. 
Even when respondents are found guilty of 
discrimination and are required to pay compensation, they 
frequently do not, and the FEA is forced to bring them to 
court for the money. "As a result," Rolston reports, "only 
one of the cases where a finding of discrimination has been 
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upheld has to date led to compensation in the complainant's 
hand."33 
In 1989 unemployment was two and one-half times higher 
among Catholics than Protestants. However outside sources 
have begun to intervene in the cause of the minorities. The 
Economist reported in 1989 that an effective lobby in 
America is working to convince parent companies with 
subsidiaries in Northern Ireland that they often perpetuate 
discrimination. This lobby has persuaded six American state 
legislatures to sign the MacBride Principles. These 
principles commit any firms in which those states have 
invested money to agree to a much stricter affirmative 
action program. 
An industrial venture in Belfast by a French firm, 
Montupet, had raised many hopes for Catholic employment. In 
parts of west Belfast, where the plant is located, Catholic 
unemployment ranges from sixty percent to eighty percent. 
Montupet officials claim the plant will employ over 1,000 
workers within five years. This number is small compared 
with the Protestant dominated shipbuilders, Harland and 
Wolff. In addition the Montupet cylinder-head project will 
not produce comparable skills for Catholics, however it may 
help to remove the employment differential.34 
Few will dispute that employment discrimination is 
prevalent in Northern Ireland. The extent of that 
discrimination however is in contention. Hewitt and Lee 
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argue that Catholics have overexaggerated discrimination, 
while O'Hearn, Schmitt, and Kelley and McAllister contend 
there is rampant discrimination in many employment sectors, 
extending into obvious income disparities. As Bill Rolston 
pointed out, the Federal Employment Agency, an arm of the 
Protestant-dominated government, has done little to help 
Catholics who file discrimination charges. Christopher 
Hewitt's claim that discrimination in the government sector 
is "hardly surprising" given Catholic animosity toward the 
government is where the heart of the Irish troubles lie. 
Catholics cannot trust a government that still blatantly 
discriminates against them in the areas of employment and 
income, and the government cannot trust a people who hold 
such arduous and militant Nationalist ideals. 
Education Discrimination 
Education is often an area where scholars look for 
discrimination within a community. This section consists of 
two parts: segregation and discrimination. Dominic Murray 
suggests that segregation reflects societal differences in 
Northern Ireland rather than creates them. Jonathan Kelley 
and Ian McAllister argue that segregation within the educa­
tion system does not necessarily reflect discrimination. 
Segregation 
The primary and secondary schools in Northern Ireland 
are segregated along religious lines. Protestant children 
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attend State Schools which reflect the teaching of the 
Anglican church, while Catholic children attend schools 
affiliated with the Roman Catholic Church. There are many 
important symbolic differences between the two schools which 
perpetuate segregation. The Union Jack flies over all state 
schools. Dominic Murray in "Schools and Conflict," cites a 
general reaction from staff in an adjoining Catholic school: 
They fly the flag down there to show that they are more 
British than the British themselves. It's also to let 
us know that they are the lords and masters and that we 
(Catholics) should be continually aware of it.35 
A study of the syllabi shows that Protestant schools 
focus almost exclusively on British material, while Catholic 
schools emphasize Irish studies and culture. A case study 
by A. Robinson in 1971 demonstrates the varying perceptions 
produced by this education system. Sixty-two percent of 
Catholic children named either John Hume or Bishop Farren as 
Derry's most important citizen, while 77% of Protestant 
children named the Lord Mayor of Derry or Northern Ireland's 
Prime Minister. When asked to name the capital city of the 
country in which Derry was located, more than half the 
Catholic children named Dublin, while more than two-thirds 
of the Protestant pupils named Belfast. It is erroneous to 
attribute these variances to the school experiences alone. 
Robinson concludes however, that the schools do little to 
moderate them. A study by J. Russell in 1972 demonstrates a 
greater likelihood for Catholic children to exhibit negative 
attitudes towards the government. However, it is again 
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difficult to assess the amount of responsibility to be taken 
by the schools for the formation of these attitudes.36 
These differences extend to the sports fields as well. 
Most Catholic schools support Irish games such as hurling, 
Camogie, or Gaelic football and avoid British games like 
hockey, cricket, or rugby. By contrast, no Protestant 
schools play any Gaelic games. Other sports appear to be 
neutral. However, the cultural difference is clear, and 
cricket, as the archetypical British sport is totally 
excluded from all Catholic schools.37 
Murray argues that these differences in the school 
systems may promote broader community divisions. 
The problem with segregated schools, with regard to 
community divisions, lies not predominately in the fact 
that they reflect different cultures but rather in the 
meanings which are attributed by observers to the overt 
demonstrations of such cultural affiliation.38 
Catholics view the flying of the Union Jack as offensive, 
while Protestants find the Catholic symbols adorning their 
schools just as annoying. One Protestant teacher described 
a Catholic school this way: 
We play St. Judes' often in games and visit their 
school regularly. I never fail to be impressed by the 
plethora of religious pictures and icons staring at you 
around every corner. It's hard to escape the view that 
a special show is being put on for our benefit.... 
This doesn't just apply to St. Jude's of course, but 
they must know that these are the very things that we 
object to, yet still they are flaunted everywhere.39 
As demonstrated above, these two cultures are so 
mutually antipathetic that any demonstration by one is 
perceived as an assault by the other. Murray contends that 
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"the actual existence of segregation had less influence on 
community division than have the meanings which are 
attributed to it by members of that community."40 
Christopher Hewitt strongly believes that one's 
occupational status can be traced to one's education. He 
suggests that the education provided by Catholic schools is 
inferior to that of State schools. However, he states that 
segregation lies with the Catholics, for they were not 
refused admittance into State schools, but chose to attend 
Catholic-run schools instead.41 
Discrimination 
Jonathan Kelley and Ian McAllister argue that Catholics 
receive an average of six months less full-time schooling 
than Protestants. Furthermore, those Catholic children who 
come from higher-status families receive less education than 
a Protestant child of the same status. For instance, if the 
father of a Catholic child held a managerial position, the 
child could expect to receive slightly under eleven years of 
full-time schooling, but the child of a Protestant who held 
the same status job could expect to receive thirteen years 
of education, a gap of two years. Although higher-status 
Catholics are at an obvious disadvantage compared to higher 
status Protestants, Kelley and McAllister note that "the 
disparities cannot be attributed to discrimination in 
education, since the educational system in Northern Ireland 
is rigidly segregated."42 
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Conclusion 
A conclusion can be drawn that there is no discrim­
ination in the educational system in Northern Ireland. 
Segregation is not always synonymous with discrimination. 
There is little evidence that an education from a 
Protestant-state school is any better or worse academically 
than a Catholic school. The two schools offer material 
which is historically and culturally significant to its 
students. This difference in education does not necessarily 
promote discrimination and is, in reality, a reflection of a 
divided society, not a cause of a divided society. 
There are those people, an idealistic few, in Northern 
Ireland who seek to end segregation. The Economist reports 
that by 1988 there were only seven mixed-religion schools, 
teaching a total of 1.000 pupils, or 0,3% of the school 
population. This is modest progress, but it was achieved 
against strong odds. These schools must start privately and 
run for two years before getting financial support from the 
government.43 Dominic Murray states that only those people 
already sympathetic to the idea of integration will support 
the mixed-religion schools. Furthermore, "when structural 
change precedes attitudinal change, it is probable that any 
impact will be restricted to within that structure only."44 
Therefore, it is unlikely that the concept of integrated 
schools will be widely accepted among either group in 
Northern Ireland. 
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IRA Reaction to Perceived Discrimination 
The present PIRA movement began on the streets in 1968-
1969 as a non-sectarian, non-violent campaign of political 
education and activism. "Civil rights was an obvious 
rallying point for all Catholic dissidents, but although the 
republican movement was heavily involved in the formation of 
the NICRA in 1967, it chose to stay out of the limelight," 
states Barry White in "From Conflict to Violence.1,45 
Nevertheless, by 1968 the PIRA was at the forefront of the 
movement and therefore involved in the decision-making 
process. Although the NICRA moderates had called a truce 
acknowledging government reforms, White explains, "others 
were ready to test Protestant patience to destruction."46 
In January, 1969, the Peoples Democracy March from Belfast 
to Derry was ambushed by the "B" Specials, a group of 
Protestant police reservists. They attacked the student and 
republican marchers causing numerous injuries and sparking 
several days and nights of rioting in Derry and Newry. 
By concentrating on their goal of non-violent political 
education and activism, the IRA had left itself defenseless 
against increasing Loyalist attack. Radical leftists 
appealed to the South for weapons to repel Loyalist 
incursions, and capitalizing on sympathy for their Catholic 
neighbors to the North, money and weapons flowed from the 
Republic into the violent wing now called the Provisional 
IRA. 
94 
The British Army was called into Northern Ireland in 
1969 to quell rioting between the two communities. As 
housing and other reforms were created by the government 
however, the PIRA shifted its attention from civil rights 
toward the Ulster Defense Regiment and the British soldiers. 
Ironically, the first soldier died in February, 1971, seven 
months after the implementation of the Northern Ireland 
Housing Executive Bill. The non-violent activism had 
quickly turned into bloodshed. The campaign rapidly 
escalated as on-duty as well as off-duty soldiers and 
policemen were killed and bombs were extensively used to 
intimidate Protestant civilians. White maintains that 
One of these, involving the bombing of a Protestant pub 
on the Shankill Road [in Belfast], marked the beginning 
of an openly sectarian campaign, and the Official IRA 
denounced [the Provisionals] "as fiendish and sectarian 
bigots, whose motives are obviously to set the 
Protestant and Catholic working class at each others 
throats".47 
Protestant Reaction to the Civil Rights Movement 
and the PIRA 
The majority of Protestants were very hostile to the 
civil rights movement. Christopher Hewitt claims that 
"Protestant hostility to the civil rights movement was 
undeniably based upon the belief that the movement was the 
old Catholic enemy in new clothes, summed up by the graffiti 
slogan CRA=IRA."48 Protestants further believed that the 
NICRA was not pursuing civil rights, but pursuing 
nationalism and the unity of Ireland. Hewitt argues that 
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these goals were attributed to the IRA influence in the 
NICRA and that IRA members played a significant role as 
stewards at meetings. 
The greatest Protestant fear is that Catholics in 
Northern Ireland will gain control of the government and 
unite with the Republic. The Times Insight Team reports 
that as early as 1954, Protestant Members of Parliament were 
proclaiming that "the government must ask themselves whether 
it were safe to employ in government service people who 
openly advocate treason."49 
When rising nationalism threatened a merger between the 
North and South, the Protestant wisdom was Unionism: 
continued coalescence with Britain to maintain the status 
quo and forestall union with the Catholic Republic. 
As the NICRA gained momentum and the government began 
making concessions to their demands for better housing and 
employment equality, Protestant radicals became agitated and 
started taunting, throwing stones at, and beating marchers. 
The police often did nothing to stop this violence, and when 
the marchers retaliated, the police clubbed and arrested 
them. 
By 1972, the PIRA had taken full control of Catholic 
areas in Derry and Belfast and waged a war with Protestant 
paramilitaries, police, and government officials. At this 
stage the violence turned openly sectarian, with Protestants 
reacting to the Republican threat in what Barry White calls, 
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"the traditional manner—spreading terror among IRA 
sympathizers by gunning down innocent Catholics in the 
street."50 
The Protestant paramilitary counterpart to the PIRA is 
the Ulster Defense Force (UDF), created in 1970 in the 
Shankill, Dublin. As membership grew to 15,000 the violence 
in Northern Ireland soared from 174 dead in 1971 to 468 in 
1972. The mission of the UDF was to protect Protestants 
from Catholic violence, maintain the Protestant-dominated 
government, and destroy the insurgents of the PIRA and their 
sympathizers. 
Conclusion 
Discrimination is often blamed for the troubles in 
Northern Ireland. It has been suggested here that housing, 
employment, and income discrimination were rampant in Ulster 
before the Civil Rights movement of 1969. 
Housing and employment discrimination was not only 
practiced by Protestants however, but by Catholics as well. 
Christopher Hewitt maintains that if the NICRA had truly 
non-sectarian orientations, it would have condemned 
discrimination by Catholic councils and businesses. 
Instead, he claims, Protestants in Newry were subjected to 
"the hipocracy of a civil rights march which ignored the 
sectarian policies of the Nationalist Council."51 
Protestant suspicions of Republican intervention and 
leadership in the NICRA were confirmed at the very first 
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civil rights march where a Nationalist MP and a Republican 
Labour MP led the march and made speeches. Further, the 
bands played "Who Fears to Speak of '98," an anti-British 
ballad, and at the close of the March the crowd sang "A 
Nation Once Again," the anthem of Irish Republicanism. 
These moves demonstrate visible and blatant links between 
the civil rights movement and the IRA. Protestant hostility 
toward the movement grew from these demonstrations of 
nationalism. 
Supposedly the civil rights movement demanded reforms. 
Yet the violence escalated after reforms were made. Hewitt 
argues that there are two reasons for this: 
First since the old system was not particularly 
inequitable, reforms could not have much impact, second 
the nationalists who predominated in the movement were 
not really interested in reforms.52 
The movement was advertised as non-sectarian. At its 
roots that may have been the case, but very quickly it 
became sectarian and nationalist. The demands made by the 
civil rights association for equal housing, employment, and 
income have been met to a degree, but Bill Rolston maintains 
that 
if reforms are not operating as fully or successfully 
as they might, that is due in large part to the 
continuing irredentist claims of reactionary 
nationalists and the Left Republicans who tail-end 
them.53 
The PIRA, through its use of violence has turned a 
civil rights movement into a war of attrition by inciting 
Protestant hostility from the very beginning of the 
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movement. In Fermenaugh, in 1969, Catholics were a 
majority, but were denied housing, representation in county 
councils, and employment. Instead of turning to violence 
however, Catholics showed their tenacity peacefully, using 
their majority in Parliamentary elections to vote in 
maverick MP's. John Conroy argues that in 1979 "peace was 
undermined by an IRA campaign."54 The Provos had been 
assassinating members of the national guard and police in 
the area since 1971, but in 1979 that number escalated and 
for a nine-month period, the area had the highest murder 
rate in Northern Ireland. Almost every Protestant family 
had someone in the security forces, and although they did 
not blame the Catholics in the immediate neighborhood, one 
Protestant stated, "If there's going to be a civil war, its 
going to start in Fermenaugh."55 
It is undeniable that the Provisional Irish Republican 
Army is responsible for maintaining Protestant hostility and 
perpetuating their claims of Catholic disloyalty and 
distrust. Since the PIRA is supposedly the mouth of the 
Catholic minority, and the PIRA refuses to recognize the 
legitimacy of the government, Rolston's claims that the 
Provos undermine any further civil rights reforms has 
considerable validity. It is hardly surprising that the 
government will not alienate its Protestant majority by 
making further reforms for Catholics who largely reject 
unionist ideology, the basis of the Northern Ireland 
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government, in favor of nationalism and reunification with 
the Republic. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
As this thesis nears the end, a reiteration of the 
original intent is necessary. The purpose was an historical 
approach to explaining the situation in Northern Ireland. 
It started in 1858, although the conflict dates back much 
further, and progressed through 1991. An attempt was made 
to explain the role the Provisional Irish Republican Army in 
the conflict since 1968 and to assess their role in 
attaining peace in the region. 
Perceived discrimination against Catholics by 
Protestants and the Ulster government was a large part of 
this thesis. It was offered that there was undoubtedly 
discrimination against Catholics in the areas of housing and 
employment, but merely segregation in the area of education. 
To a large degree discrimination has been eradicated, 
unfortunately however, there are still employment and income 
disparities in Ulster. It was argued that terrorism is 
counter-productive in the elimination of discrimination in 
Northern Ireland because it promotes Protestant and 
government stereotypes of Catholic disloyalty and distrust. 
It seems that many people who speak about the situation 
in Northern Ireland have either one of two opinions toward 
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those involved in the violence. Either they blame the 
Catholics or they blame the Protestants. However it is much 
more complicated. As discussed in the introduction, 
religion itself has very little to do with the violence. 
Religious affiliation however, is a main key. 
Throughout the conflict, one's religion has been a 
symbol of status and power. It has dictated where one 
lives, goes to school and works. Religious affiliation is 
strongly present in social clubs and political 
organizations. It dominates the lives of all who live in 
Northern Ireland because, simply stated, it marks 
Protestants as oppressers, Catholics as terrorists, and all 
who live in Ulster as potential targets. 
Unfortunately, terrorism is perpetrated not only by the 
Provos, but by the Ulster Volunteer Force and the Ulster 
Defense Association as well. Thomas Hachey in "A Courtship 
with Terrorism," states that the failure of Northern Ireland 
authorities to 
protect their Catholic citizens from Protestant 
militants bent on revenge for IRA outrages has prompted 
such Catholics to welcome help from anyone who would 
provide it. Very often it has been the Provos who have 
accommodated that need.1 
The lack of support and Protection for Catholics led to 
the rise of the Provisionals in the late 1960s and early 
1970s. The strategic goals of the PIRA in the 1970s were 
the end of discrimination against Catholics in the areas of 
housing, employment, and education, reunification with the 
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Republic of Ireland and subsequent Parliamentary rule, and 
removal of occupying British forces in Northern Ireland. 
The tactical goals of the Provos have been many. Bombings, 
assassinations, and harassment have been the mainstay of 
tactical success for more than twenty years. The 
Provisionals run their terrorist machine effectively and 
forcefully. The organization is tight and its members 
focused. 
It is probable however, that their strategic goals will 
not be met. Ironically, it is their tactical success that 
will forever keep Northern Ireland and the Republic 
separated. Desmond O'Malley, Minister of Justice in the 
Fianna Fail (the largest political party in the South) 
government, speaking to the Emerald Association in New York 
in October 1972 said: 
The major damage done by the IRA violence is, of 
course, the damage it does to the prospects for a 
reconciliation between the two traditions in the North. 
Another major tragedy is what it is doing to the 
children and adolescents of the stricken cities of 
Belfast and Derry, young people whose minds cannot but 
be seared for a generation to come. The damage to the 
minds of a generation of young people is almost too 
terrible to bear thinking about.2 
In the beginning of the latest conflict the 
achievements of the NICRA and the Provisionals were 
considerable. The NICRA had convinced the government, 
largely through peaceful demonstrations, to implement anti­
discrimination measures. The demonstrations resulted in the 
housing reforms in 1970, and, to a degree, the Fair 
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Employment Act of 1975. The Provos had unchallenged control 
of the urban Catholic ghettos in 1971 and 1972. Richard 
Clutterbuck maintains that their tactical guerrilla strategy 
3td& rYi&r-n 
provided an overreaction by Storemont "which induced the 
British Government in March 1972 to bring fifty years of 
discriminatory Protestant rule to an end."3 
Instead of turning this success into political 
opportunity and negotiating with the British to meet their 
goals, the Provos chose to further their attacks on 
government officials and began a clandestine war with the 
British security forces. "Having no political philosophy," 
Clutterbuck says, "they were unable to take advantage of the 
political opportunity they themselves had created."4 The 
violence of the PIRA unequivicably curbed any progress that 
was being made through civil right reforms in Ulster. 
Throughout Irish history there are instances where 
legitimate movements and organizations have achieved 
political and social success. Disestablishment of the Irish 
Protestant Church in 1866, implementation of the Land Bill 
in 1870, and government cooperation with the Official Land 
League created the Land Act of 1881. Additionally, Home 
Rule was legislated for Ireland in 1910, and the Irish Free 
State was created in 1914. Due to the moderate ideology of 
Sinn Fein at the time, their political popularity grew and 
they won considerable victories in the elections of 1920 and 
1922. 
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Through the years we can trace the popular support of 
the Republican movement with social change and increased 
violence. All of the aforementioned achievements were 
accomplished through legitimate, cooperative measures, not 
violence and civil disobedience. It is a fact that as 
violence increased in the Republic during those tumultuous 
years, popular support for the violent organization waned. 
The Easter Rising of 1916 was not popularly supported and 
did very little to help the cause of Home Rule. It seems 
that this factor is a constant throughout all of Irish 
history. 
In the early 1970s support for the NICRA was high among 
Catholics in both the North and South, and sympathizers in 
Britain and America. All wanted to see housing and 
employment discrimination come to an end. Since this was 
the main demand of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights 
Association, which had a significant IRA membership, 
demonstrations and violence should have stopped when housing 
reforms were made in 1971 and the Fair Employment Act was 
passed in 1976. 
By that time however, the goals of the IRA and PIRA had 
significantly changed. The fluidity of the Provisionals' 
ideology made it possible for them to expand on the ideals 
of the NICRA and further the cause of freedom and reunifica­
tion. The governments of Northern Ireland and Britain, 
however, were not as flexible. They met the original 
109 
demands to end discrimination, but would go no further. 
The IRA failed to recognize the success that had been 
gained through the mass demonstration in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s. As they turned to more violent methods of 
communication with the government, the security forces and 
the Protestant population retaliated. Paul Arthur states 
that 
in a conflict where more than 55 percent of the victims 
have been innocent civilians, republican paramilitaries 
may have managed singlehandedly to have redefined the 
Northern Ireland problem as one of terrorism rather 
than of rights.5 
When the Provos moved their fight from the arena of 
discrimination to freedom from British rule and 
reunification with the Republic, many Protestants who had 
supported the original cause withdrew their support and grew 
leery of the organization. As violence worsened in the 
1970s and 1980s, Catholics in the North, South, Britain and 
the international community felt disgust toward the PIRA. 
This attitude is evident in the dwindling military supplies 
and money being sent to the Provos, and the lack of ballots 
being cast for Sinn Fein. 
Not only will the lack of popular support for the PIRA 
keep them from attaining their strategic goals, but so will 
Protestant and government hostility. The unfortunate factor 
in this instance is that this hostility is directed not only 
at PIRA members, but toward the Catholic community as a 
whole. Even during the civil rights marches, Protestants 
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viewed the movement as a mere front for subversive 
republican activities. At the time English journalists 
deemed them as paranoid bigots who wanted to perpetuate 
Catholic oppression. Although the movement professed to be 
purely civil rights oriented, it was clear from the 
beginning that there were republican undertones and 
motivations. 
It was the consequent actions of the IRA at civil 
rights gatherings that confirmed Protestant and government 
suspicions of IRA infiltration and activity. These actions 
(the singing of republican songs and the flying of the Irish 
tricolor) caused already leery Protestants to view the 
entire civil rights movement with disdain and loathing. 
Christopher Hewitt maintains that 
any intelligent Catholic leader would know that a 
movement with such conspicuous nationalist and 
Republican connections would alienate moderate 
Protestant support and provoke sectarian violence. The 
handful of Protestants involved in the early stages of 
the civil rights movement quickly dropped out, making a 
mockery of the NICRA's pretensions to be a non-
sectarian movement.6 
Given the history between Catholics and Protestants it 
is no wonder that Protestants rejected the civil rights 
movement when they learned of the IRA penetration and 
influence. As the movement openly changed from civil rights 
to reunification and grew more violent, that brutality was 
reciprocated in a more insidious way. While the PIRA 
primarily target government officials and security forces, 
the Ulster Defense Association and the Ulster Volunteer 
Ill 
Force attack Catholic civilians they deem disloyal. Conor 
Cruise O'Brien has observed that the effect of the effort of 
the Provos to protect Catholics and fight for independence 
and reunification has been to 
raise the level of sectarian consciousness. They have 
encouraged the Catholics and helped them to win 
important and long-overdue reforms. They have 
frightened and angered Protestants and if their efforts 
could be continued on the same lines and with the same 
kind of success, they would bring the people of the 
province and island sectarian civil war. And in fact, 
even at present, language and gestures which are 
subjectively revolutionary but have appeal only within 
one sectarian community, are objectively language and 
gestures of sectarian civil war."7 
There can be no peace with the Provisional Irish 
Republican Army. They have reiterated many times that they 
will keep fighting for their goals at all costs. The 
Conservative government of Margaret Thatcher and John Major 
have steadfastly held onto Northern Ireland and maintain 
security forces in the region. In the unlikely event that 
the troops are pulled from the region, full-scale civil war 
would ensue: Protestants against Catholics, both fighting 
to preserve their land and heritage. Padraig O'Malley is 
confident that 
the Provisionals have settled in for the long haul with 
the means and the resources to sustain the protracted 
campaign it entails, secure in the knowledge that a 
majority of Catholics, both North and South, do not 
regard their actions as merely criminal. So long as 
the Catholic ghettos exist, they will not want for 
recruits. So long as they have martyrs, they will not 
want for a sense of historical continuity. So long as 
the prison culture prevails, they will no want for the 
propaganda of repression. And so long as the fear of a 
Protestant backlash lurks in the collective conscious­
ness of the minority they will not be abandoned.® 
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These are the hopes of the Provisionals. They are 
counting on violent Protestant and government reactions to 
their campaign of terror. As long as there is retaliation 
and continued opression of Catholics in Northern Ireland, 
the Provisional Irish Republican Army will have enough 
popular support to maintain their campaign and fight for a 
united Ireland. 
There can be no peace without negotiation, and no 
negotiation until the Provisionals put their weapons down. 
History has shown that violence is counter-productive and 
the only way to achieve equality is through verbal 
communication and dialogue with the British government. 
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